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Poverty remains a pressing problem in rural areas of the developing world. This is also 
true for India. Expanding the rural financial system with a focus on increasing access to 
credit has been an important approach for poverty alleviation in India. Nevertheless, 
there is empirical evidence and theoretical consideration that, credit markets fail for the 
poor in particular. Market failures can be either driven by moral hazard or adverse 
selection. In the case of moral hazard, the borrower can either devote insufficient effort 
to enable subsequent repayment (ex ante moral hazard) or he may voluntarily default 
(ex post moral hazard). His actions remain hidden. In both cases, the loan would not be 
repaid successfully. To avoid default, lenders may demand collateral in a form that the 
poor cannot provide. Adverse selection describes the process of relatively more risky 
borrowers selecting into loan commitments. If the lender cannot observe the riskiness of 
potential borrowers, due to information asymmetry, he may demand a higher interest 
rate in an effort to compensate for loan defaults by riskier borrowers. This may in turn 
preclude relatively risk-averse borrowers who may not be willing to bear the risk 
premium, which represents the compensation for the default risk of riskier borrowers. 
The relatively more risky borrowers remain in the market, and consequently, the 
likelihood of loan default increases. In the extreme case, this can result in a totally 
nonexistent credit market. 
To complement prior research which focused on the supply side and market failures of 
India’s rural financial system, we focus on rural households’ and individuals’ financial 
decision making in this study. We argue that this perspective can contribute to the 
understanding of outcomes of rural households’ financial decisions. In this study, we 
first shed additional light on the borrower as an individual, the means available and the 
limits to an individual’s financial decision making. Second, we stress the decision-
making process within a household. Several individuals may be involved in this process 
and may determine the outcomes of financial decisions at the household level.  
The first objective focuses on an individual’s financial literacy, as it is central to 
undertake informed financial decisions. However, in the context of poverty, taxes on 
mental capacity may disturb an individual’s decision making. Mental capacity, which is 
limited for each individual, can be demanded by pressing financial obligations (e.g., 
education, health and social events) to which individuals may be exposed 
simultaneously. In contrast, non-poor individuals may be relatively less exposed to this 




tax. They may be exposed to the same financial obligations, but are able to settle them 
more easily, as they are not poor. We explore whether such a tax negatively affects an 
individual’s level of financial literacy. Experimentally, we show that for individuals, 
considered to be poor, such a tax negatively affects their level of financial literacy. In 
contrast, individuals who are not considered poor are not negatively affected by the tax. 
Moreover, we find that a financial incentive can act as a counter-measure. It increases 
the level of financial literacy. We recommend that policymakers consider measures that 
assist individuals in financial decision making when they have a lower level of financial 
literacy and to consider incorporating financial incentives in measures intended to 
increase financial literacy, e.g., in financial literacy training. 
Our research is informative on the relevance of financial decision making for poverty in 
rural India. We find that a tax on mental capacity negatively influences financial literacy 
in the context of poverty. Thus, financial literacy, which is central for informed 
financial decisions, is negatively affected. When informed financial decision making is 
hampered, it may become more difficult to escape poverty. In essence, this suggests a 
vicious circle, whereby poverty promotes the likelihood of the tax on mental capacity 
and the tax leads to worse financial decisions due to lower financial literacy. In turn, the 
likelihood of escaping poverty diminishes. 
For the second research objective, we focus on loan control among women who are 
members of a Self-help group (SHG) and have access to loans through the SHG. We 
analyze the influence of loan control on the likelihood that the households invest into 
agriculture. Agricultural investments are important for potential poverty reduction due 
to their productive nature. Moreover, agriculture is a traditional male domain in India. 
In our econometric analysis, we show that the likelihood of investing into agriculture 
declines with increasing loan control by women. The implication of our findings is 
twofold. First, this inverse relationship shows that households in which women have 
less loan control invest in domains over which women have no say, agriculture in our 
study. Thus, the women bear the obligation to repay while having no control over the 
loan. This may make it more difficult for SHG member women to repay their loans and 
to develop the reputation of being a reliable borrower. Second, although this burden 
contradicts the goal of empowering women through access to credit, the household as a 
whole may still benefit from the productive agricultural investment. This is the tradeoff 
found in our study in the case of SHG lending. We suggest measures intended to 
diminish that tradeoff. Measures to encourage women’s agricultural investments are 




discussed. First, we elaborate on women’s access to land and markets in India. Second, 
we discuss the potential for diminishing the tradeoff through measures to increase loan 
control for women. In particular, we argue that it is worth exploring having loans that 
are not distributed directly to the SHG member women but are instead transferred to an 
agricultural investment counterpart. The women can then obtain goods or services from 
the investment counterpart and do not face the risk of losing control over the money 
when bringing it home. This research is informative for rural development because it 
identifies two diametrically opposed outcomes that are both important for rural 
development, namely potential monetary benefits at the household level through 
productivity-increasing investments and women’s empowerment in the area of loan 
control. 
This dissertation relies on data collected through a survey of 658 households between 
February and May 2014 in India. To conduct the survey, we visited the households of 
SHG member women. During the survey, we conducted an experiment that yielded the 
data for the first research objective. The second research objective relies on cross-
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Studying financial decision making in rural areas of the developing world is 
tremendously important for poverty reduction and thus welfare improvements. To what 
extent can “correct” financial decision making contribute to poverty reduction? This 
focus stresses not only the rural household’s and individual’s perspective and the means 
at their disposal but also the constraints they face in the context of poverty. Financial 
means, in theory, should enable poor households and individuals to undertake 
productivity-increasing investments that in turn, may raise income and thus potentially 
improve welfare. In particular, the poor may experience substantial productivity 
increases from such investments, when they are capital constrained (Karlan & Morduch, 
2010). Empirical evidence e.g. from Udry and Anagol (2006) shows that investing in a 
new technology, pineapple cultivation, brings high returns to Ghanaian farmers. 
According to Wollni and Zeller (2007), farmers in Costa Rica receive higher prices 
when growing and selling specialty coffee. Thus, investments may be rewarding in 
monetary terms. 
India, in particular, provides a well-suited study case, first, because poverty there 
remains a pressing and highly debated issue (Deaton & Kozel, 2005). Currently 
available statistics provided by the World Bank (2016) for the year 2011 indicate that 
the rural poverty head-count ratio is relatively high. It amounts to 25.7%, compared to 
the urban ratio of 13.7%, while the ratio for the whole country is 21.9%. Second, the 
promotion of rural financial markets is a major strategy employed in India to alleviate 
poverty (Mahajan & Navin, 2013). 
The next section (1.1) introduces the institutional framework of India’s rural financial 
system. This description of the supply side introduces the rural financial system’s 
development. The subsequent section (1.2) will complement this description with 
theoretical and empirical considerations regarding market failures. Building on lessons 
learned from that focus, we will introduce our research focus on financial decision 
making in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 will describe the data and outline the remaining 





1.1 The development of India’s rural financial market 
Financial decision making is not taking place in a vacuum; thus, before discussing 
financial decision making in greater detail, we will begin with a brief overview of 
India’s rural financial system with a focus on the credit market, following Garikipati 
(2008), where not stated otherwise. Indian rural credit intuitions date back to 1904, 
during the period before independence. At that time, rural credit cooperatives were 
founded as the major source of capital in rural India (Robert, 1979). In the 1960s, with 
the advent of the green revolution, increased credit demand could not be served by the 
rural cooperatives alone. In 1969, the rural financial system expanded through the 
nationalization of commercial banks. The nationalized banks were required to open 
rural branches. This state intervention was grounded primarily in market failure. The 
drivers of market failure may be context specific, and policies to counteract it may be 
particularly suited to the circumstances present in a given case. The striking presence of 
poverty in rural India justified the state-led credit expansion. In the context of policies 
to combat poverty, credit expansion was preferred over politically sensitive measures 
such as land redistribution or tenancy laws (Garikipati, 2008). In 1975, Regional Rural 
Banks (RRBs) were introduced to supplement the nationalized banks in servicing the 
rural poor. This led to increased geographical coverage and thus increased access to 
credit for poor households (Chavan & Ramakumar, 2002). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the credit expansion in rural India. Between 1971-2 and 2007-8, the credit  
Table 1. Credit in rural India 
Year   Share in Total Credit (in %)    
 
Total 
  Cooperatives State Governments SCBs RRBs (in mil. Rs.) 
1971-2  87.1 11.2 1.7 - 8,830 
1981-2  57.7 3.6 34.8 3.9 42,960 
1991-2  50.2 2.9 41.7 5.2 115,380 
2001-2  56.4 0.8 34.4 8.4 541,950 
2002-3  52.2 - 38.8 9 651,750 
2003-4  48 - 43.4 8.6 834,270 
2004-5  42.7 - 45.9 11.3 1,053,030 
2005-6  33.4 - 56 10.6 1,440,210 
2006-7  28.5 - 60.8 10.7 1,895,130 
2007-8  29.6 - 58.2 12.2 1,949,530 
Source: RBI (2010). 
volume increased by approximately a factor of 221, from Rs. 8,830 million to Rs. 
1,949,530 million. Moreover, Table 1 shows how scheduled commercial banks (SCBs), 
the label for nationalized commercial banks, and RRBs increased their share of credit 





In addition to the institutional framework, state interventions included policies such as 
directed credit to priority sectors (e.g., agriculture), loan waivers, subsidies and bail outs 
of nonperforming institutions. These policies were followed by an extreme erosion of 
borrower discipline (Meyer & Nagarajan, 2000). A prominent example is the Integrated 
Rural Development Program, initiated in 1978. Although it is said to have provided 
loans to ca. 27 million poor households, it is criticized for incorporating a high share 
(59%) of overdue loans (Pulley, 1989). This clearly demonstrates that policies need to 
be tailored to address the mechanism that drives a market failure, even when the driver 
is unclear. These mechanisms will be discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2. 
In 1982, India’s state intervention in rural financial markets produced its apex 
institution, namely the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD). NABARD’s mandate is to refinance cooperatives, RRBs and SCBs and to 
manage their institutional structure (Meyer & Nagarajan, 2000). Although the 
centralization created by NABARD’s mandate enabled measures to be coordinated 
throughout the whole country, at the beginning of the 1990s it was concluded that 
refinancing nonperforming institutions could not be continued and that measures to 
monitor and enforce repayment could not be sustained through NABARD (Garikipati, 
2008). 
In response, the so-called SHG-bank linkage program was initiated by NABARD in 
1992 (Karmakar, 2008). This program created another dimension of Indian rural 
finance, namely Self-help groups (SHGs). The most prominent example of group 
lending is the Grameen Bank, founded in 1983 by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh 
(Yunus, 1999). Peer monitoring is inherent to that bank’s model. Group lending and 
peer monitoring can prevent market failure. The responsibility for screening the group 
to detect bad credit risk lies with the group itself, as does the monitoring of ongoing 
loans and enforcement of repayment (Ghatak, 1999). SHGs typically consist of women 
and have between 10 and 15 members. In the SHG-bank linkage program, the SHGs are 
financed through banks or Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are 
financed through NABARD (Garikipati, 2008). 
Table 2 provides an overview of the expansion of the SHG-bank linkage program. 
Between 1992-3 and 2009-10, the number of linked SHGs increased by approximately a 
factor of 6,224, whereas the average bank loan volume per SHG increased by 





The crisis in microfinance, the mass defaults of loans, that emerged in 2010 in the State 
of Andra Pradesh, gave rise to critical voices against this model (Mader, 2013). 
According to Mahajan and Navin (2013) the mass default, which they identify as the 
decline in the loan recovery rate from above 95% in 2007-8 to 60%-70% in 2010-11, is 
an outcome of state intervention. They argue that politicians in Andra Pradesh were in 
favor of the SHG- bank linkage model. The model allows politicians to garner votes, as 
Table 2. SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India: Selected Indicators 
Year  SHGs Linked Bank Loan Bank Loan per SHG 
 
(No.) (in mil. Rs.) (in Rs) 
1992-3  255 2.9 11,372 
1994-5  1,502 17.9 11,917 
1996-7  3,841 57.8 15,048 
1998-9  18,678 333.1 17,833 
2000-1  149,050 2878.9 19,315 
2002-3  255,882 10,223.30 39,953 
2004-5  539,365 29,942.60 55,514 
2006-7  1,105,749 65,700.00 59,416 
2008-9  1,609,586 122,535.10 76,128 
2009-10  1,587,000 144,433.00 91,010 
Source: NABARD (2010); RBI (2010). 
 
the promotion of SHGs can serve as a means of reaching out to the poor. However, the 
model of SHGs linked to banks, under public influence, was seen to face competition 
from microfinance institutions outside the linkage program. Thus, Mahajan and Navin 
(2013) argue, the competing institutions were adversely affected by policy measures 
such as subsidizing the interest rates of linked SHGs, passing laws that forbid 
competing institutions to visit their borrowers to collect recoveries and making public 
announcements that loans from the microfinance institutions that are not part of the 
linkage program, need not be repaid. 
In summary, the development of India’s rural financial system experienced massive 
interventions at several points in time, justified by the presence of credit market failures 
for the poor. To provide a better understanding of credit market failures, the subsequent 
section elaborates on relevant theoretical considerations and recent empirical evidence. 
1.2 Credit supply and market failure 
The textbook case typically states that credit markets can fail for the poor for two 





form required by a formal lender to insure against loan defaults may be lacking or 
charging excessive interest rates may prevent participation by the poor. Second, the 
poor may take up loans but not repay them. This may not be intuitive and will be 
elaborated below. These factors relate to the mechanisms underlying credit market 
failures. 
The two mechanisms behind market failure are moral hazard and adverse selection. If 
market failure stems from moral hazard, we can differentiate between ex ante and ex 
post moral hazard (Karlan & Morduch, 2010). Ex ante moral hazard may occur if, at 
relatively higher interest rates, the borrower is discouraged from devoting sufficient 
effort, in terms of mobilizing any sources available to generate funds, to repay the 
principal and interest. Ex post moral hazard refers to the case of voluntary default. Here, 
although the borrower can afford to repay the loan plus interest, he decides not to do so. 
The argument behind moral hazard behavior is that the poor have a relatively lower 
incentive to repay. The lower incentive to repay is related to the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility. Each additional unit of money is of relatively more value 
to the poor than to the non-poor. Thus, the obligation to repay the same loan amount, in 
absolute terms, comes at higher opportunity cost to the poor compared to the non-poor. 
The utility of spending the money on alternative purposes may outweigh the utility 
derived from repaying the loan. 
Adverse selection can occur under imperfect information. In particular, if the lender 
does not know the production function of the borrower, a high interest rate can attract 
riskier borrowers. In the event of success they can repay; otherwise, they cannot. The 
higher level of risk involved increases the likelihood of default (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Conversely, according to de Meza and Webb (1987), advantageous selection can occur. 
The relationship between risk and return is modeled differently. Entrepreneurs with 
higher intrinsic quality have higher returns. An increase in interest rates would then lead 
to the selection of entrepreneurs with higher quality, and the marginal borrower who 
drops out would have lower intrinsic quality. 
Moreover, the information asymmetries between borrower and lender may lead the 
lender to demand more collateral. However, this may also lead prospective borrowers 
who are good credit risk, and can afford the collateral, to withdraw from borrowing. The 






In addition to their lack of formally accepted collateral, the poor may withdraw from 
rural credit markets due to excessively high interest rates. Lenders may demand higher 
interest rates to compensate for default risk in the event that borrowers cannot provide 
collateral. This is exemplarily derived in Akerlof’s groundbreaking theory (1970) on the 
market for lemons (Akerlof, 1970). According to Akerlof (1970), the fundamentally 
higher interest rates charged by moneylenders in rural India relative to banks in the 
central cities are seen as a driver of landlessness among many poor rural households in 
India. The moneylender only engages with clients when he can easily enforce 
repayment or when he has sufficient knowledge of the personal character traits of the 
potential client. The undersupply of formal rural financial institutions allows him to 
demand high interest rates
1
. The high interest rates may in turn discourage adverse 
selection of borrowers, meaning that they may discourage the selection of potential 
risky borrowers. Consequently, poor rural households withdraw from borrowing from 
moneylenders, but high rates may also drive away households that are good credit risks. 
In theory, the sheer absence of loan uptake does not prove a market failure. However, 
experimental interventions that increase credit supply report an increase in loan uptake. 
Banerjee et al. (2015a) find increased loan uptake in evaluations of microenterprises in 
India, and Karlan and Zinman (2010a) report such a result for the case of Manila, the 
Philippines. For consumer credit evaluations in South Africa, see Karlan and Zinman 
(2010b). Which mechanism is driving a market failure may depend on the context. It 
remains, e.g., a matter of debate whether adverse selection or moral hazard drives 
market failures.  
The story of India’s rural financial system is closely related to trial and error in fixing 
market failures. Our research enters at a moment, when a focus on the supply side and 
related market failures had served to substantially explaining credit market outcomes for 
the poor. Nevertheless, evidence from randomized control trials that remains 
inconclusive regarding microfinance’s effects on welfare calls for further research to 
shed some light on how financial tools can address poverty (Banerjee et al., 2015b)
2
. To 
complement the research conducted thus far on the supply side and market failures, we 
focus on the financial decision making of India’s rural households. 
                                                 
1
 Note, that the article by Akerlof was published when the state-led intervention had just begun near the 
end of the 1960s, and thus poor rural borrowers had few alternatives to moneylenders. 
2
 The studies described in Banerjee et al. (2015b) offer no conclusive results regarding microcredit’s 






1.3 Problem statement and research objectives 
As outlined at the beginning, the problem of rural poverty persists in India. From a 
research perspective, we still do not know the extent to which a focus on financial 
decision making can contribute to a better understanding of poverty. We argue that this 
focus on financial decision making by rural households and individuals can shed light 
on the outcomes on the rural financial system and thus complement the research on the 
supply side. We first focus on the financial literacy of individuals and then on the 
control over financial resources within a household and elaborate on the importance of 
each factor for rural financial market outcomes. 
Financial literacy describes the uptake and handling of financial information to 
undertake informed financial decisions (Cole et al., 2014; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008; 
van Rooij, 2012). According to Lusardi and Mitchell (2014), financial literacy may be 
welfare enhancing. This is of particular importance in developing countries, where 
financial literacy can help to reduce a person’s poverty through utilizing financial 
services in an informed manner. 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on financial literacy in the context of 
poverty remains scarce. In the presence of poverty, financial literacy may be disturbed 
by a tax on mental capacity. A tax on mental capacity can stem from circumstances that 
demand mental capacity. A household’s financial obligations, e.g., education fees, 
health shocks or social events, may impose a tax on mental capacity (Mullainathan & 
Shafir, 2014). 
The problem is that this tax demands relatively more mental capacity from poor than 
from non-poor individuals (Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). A poor person may be pressured 
when simultaneously exposed to several financial obligations, while a non-poor person 
could simply meet the obligations instantly by paying them off. This is not to say that 
non-poor persons are immune to the mental capacity tax. According to Mullainathan 
and Shafir (2014), a mental capacity tax can also stem, e.g., from time scarcity. 
However, when the tax stems from financial obligations, the poor are the ones affected. 
The first research objective of this dissertation is to analyze the relationship between a 
mental capacity tax and financial literacy in the context of poverty. 
Negatively affected financial literacy may have consequences for the outcomes of 





Second, we focus on loan control over financial resources and how it may influence the 
investment decisions of a household. SHGs that are exclusively available to women 
provide women with access to financial services. However, women who take loans 
through SHGs may not necessarily control the proceeds of these loans (Goetz & Gupta, 
1996). Their male spouse could also control the borrowed funds. The consequences of 
such a development for investment decisions at the household level are unclear. Men 
and women invest differently (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Menon et al., 2011). In rural 
India, agricultural investments may generate higher income for poor households. The 
likelihood of investing in agriculture, a male domain in India, may depend upon the 
person who controls the loan. 
Moreover, analyzing loan control is important for a better understanding of the 
consequences for borrower women. When women lack loan control, while they 
nevertheless have to repay the loan, they can no longer utilize the borrowed money to 
generate the funds to repay the loan. 
Our second research objective is to analyze a women’s loan control over a loan taken 
in her name and its influence on a household’s investment decisions. 
1.4 Data and outline 
The analyses of the objectives rely on a data set from India. We conducted a household 
survey and an experiment in India. Between February and May 2014, we surveyed 658 
households in two sub-districts of Pune District in the State of Maharashtra, namely 
Junnar and Khed. The household questionnaire is attached in Appendix 4 of this 
dissertation. 
Chapter 2 is titled Implications of a tax on mental capacity and a financial incentive for 
financial literacy in the context of poverty: Evidence from India. This study analyzes the 
extent to which a tax on mental capacity and a financial incentive can influence 
financial literacy using our experimental data. Our results are derived from comparisons 
between treatment and control groups. 
In Chapter 3, titled Women’s loan control and the household’s investment behavior: The 
case of women’s Self-help group loans and agricultural investments in rural India, we 
analyze the relationship between women’s loan control over their SHG loans and the 
household’s likelihood of investing the proceeds from that loan in agriculture. As Indian 





control for the household’s decision on agricultural investment. We apply several 
econometric models to address this research objective. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we derive conclusions from our main findings and discuss policy 
recommendations and the limitations of our study. Moreover, suggestions for further 
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IMPLICATIONS OF A TAX ON MENTAL CAPACITY AND A FINANCIAL 








Financial literacy is important for the ability to make informed financial decisions. 
However, in developing countries, poverty may correlate with discriminatory 
circumstances that may hamper financial literacy. In this article, we examine a factor, 
namely a tax on mental capacity, that plays a distinctive role for financial literacy in the 
context of poverty, relative to a situation in which poverty is absent. First, we provide 
experimental evidence showing that a tax on mental capacity will negatively affect the 
level of financial literacy among the poor. For the non-poor such a tax should have no 
effect. Second, a financial incentive will have a positive effect on the poor’s (and non-
poor’s) level of financial literacy. The results imply that the poor’s financial literacy 
may be reduced by a tax on mental capacity and, moreover, that inducing greater effort 
through a financial incentive seems to counteract this “loss” of financial literacy. Thus, 
policy makers in developing countries may face lower levels of financial literacy among 
the poor, a target group for, e.g., financial inclusion policies. However, the article 
further demonstrates that financial incentives can increase the level of financial literacy, 
what may serve to support measures, such as financial literacy trainings, intended to 
increase financial literacy. 
 
Keywords: Financial literacy; mental capacity; financial incentive; poverty 
 
  
                                                 
3
 This chapter is co-authored by Meike Wollni. The authors’ contributions are as follows: In close 
cooperation with Meike Wollni, I conceptualized and designed the research and analyzed and 
interpreted the data. I conducted the survey and the experiment. I wrote a first draft and revised it in 





2.1 Introduction  
Financial literacy is described as the uptake and handling of financial information to 
undertake informed financial decisions (Cole et al. 2014; Lusardi & Mitchell 2008; van 
Rooij et al., 2012). The concept is relevant to, e.g., understanding an individual’s 
performance in financial planning, wealth accumulation, debt management, or pensions 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). These are means for welfare improvement, and thus it is 
important to deepen the understanding of financial literacy. 
For developing countries, the linkage between welfare improvements and financial 
literacy is of particular importance. In India, financial literacy is crucial, because 
policies to address poverty depend to a large extent on financial services, particularily 
on access to credit (Mahajan & Navin, 2013). The relationship between potential means 
of welfare improvements and financial literacy has received extensive scholarly 
attention (see, e.g., Behrman et al. 2012; Gaurav et al. 2011; Bruhn & Zia 2011; Cole et 
al. 2011; Drexler et al., 2014). 
However in developing countries, financial literacy may be adversely affected by a tax 
on mental capacity. According to the scarcity theory of Mullainathan and Shafir (2014), 
poverty may lead to a tax on mental capacity. This article analyzes the implications of 
such a tax on mental capacity for financial literacy and, moreover, whether such a 
negative effect on financial literacy can be countered by a financial incentive that may 
positively affect financial literacy. Gaurav and Singh (2012) find that cognitive ability, 
measured using a test on mathematics and probability, is predictive of financial literacy 
for Indian farmers. This finding is similar to that of Agarwal and Mazumder (2013), 
who find that higher cognitive abilities are related to making fewer financial mistakes. 
Linking the literature on poverty and cognitive function, Mani et al. (2013) find that 
poverty impedes cognitive function. The fact of being poor acts as a tax on an 
individual’s mental capacity. According to North (1992), individual mental capacity is 
limited. Thus, a tax on that mental capacity can hamper well-informed decision making. 
This may prevent individuals from undertaking informed financial decisions and thus 
make it more difficult for them to overcome poverty. Through an experiment, we test 
whether a tax on mental capacity negatively affects financial literacy. To the best of our 
knowledge, this relationship, despite its importance given its potential implications for 
individual welfare outcomes, remains unaddressed in the literature. Moreover, we test 





Identifying ways to increase the level of financial literacy, especially in the context of 
poverty, can further inform our understanding of the potential incentive elements for 
policies intended to increase financial literacy. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a 
field experiment with microfinance client households in rural India. 
Our sample consists only of households that have access to microfinance. The setting of 
our study stresses the importance of financial literacy, when access to financial services 
is already present. We argue that it is not sufficient for policies to merely focus on 
providing access to finance. Access to finance itself does not necessarily lead to 
improvements in welfare (Banerjee et al., 2015). Further, the potential effects of a tax 
on mental capacity and a financial incentive on financial literacy need to be better 
understood, especially when access to financial services exists. 
In the following, the theoretical background and the research objectives will be outlined 
in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the experimental design, Section 2.4 outlines the 
methodological approach, Section 2.5 presents the results, Section 2.6 discusses effects 
on mental capacity, Section 2.7 discusses potential implications of the results, and 
finally, Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical background and research objectives  
The first research objective is to test whether financial literacy is negatively affected by 
a tax on mental capacity in the presence of poverty. We build on the scarcity theory of 
Mullainathan and Shafir (2014). According to their theory, scarcity in a specific 
domain, in our case scarcity of money, may impose a tax on mental capacity, meaning 
that less mental capacity is available for further well-informed decision making. In our 
context, the scarcity of money imposes particular concerns clustered around poverty. 
Meeting the obligations for, e.g., the children’s education, health shocks, funerals or 
festivals impose a tax on the mental capacity of an individual affected by poverty. In 
general, exposure to concerns related to the examples above is not restricted to the poor. 
Such concerns may also demand mental capacity from those living in abundance. 
However, on average, those concerns – in the absence of emergencies – can be 
addressed sequentially (Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). Thus, the mental capacity needed to 
address the issues is not demanded at a single point in time. In contrast, those affected 
by a scarcity of money are simultaneously exposed to several concerns, thereby 





This article builds on the lessons of the relationship among poverty, cognitive function 
and financial literacy. To the best of our knowledge, the experimental literature on the 
relationship between poverty and financial literacy in the context of developing 
countries is scant. Mani et al. (2013) compare the impact of a tax on mental capacity 
treatment on measures of overall cognitive function among poor and non-poor 
respondents. They find a lower cognitive function for the poor. We bring the poverty-
induced tax on mental capacity into perspective of financial literacy. Is financial literacy 
affected by the tax on mental capacity in the presence of poverty? If we assume that 
poverty impedes cognitive function through a tax on mental capacity and that only the 
“remaining” mental capacity (which is untaxed) can be devoted to financial literacy, is 
there a direct relationship between exposure to that tax and the observable level of 
financial literacy? This leads to our first hypothesis:  
1. A tax on mental capacity negatively affects the financial literacy of the poor. 
For the poor, a tax on mental capacity was triggered in our experiment through exposure 
to a (hypothetical) financial shock. The exposure to the shock triggered thoughts on the 
respondent’s own financial situation. These thoughts demanded additional mental 
capacity from the respondent, which left less mental capacity free for other tasks. Thus, 
we expect to observe lower performance on our measure of financial literacy among the 
poor who were exposed to the tax on mental capacity. For the non-poor, we do not 
expect the tax on mental capacity to be triggered, and thus, among the non-poor, the 
level of financial literacy should not differ between respondents who were exposed to a 
tax on mental capacity and those who were not exposed to it. 
Our second objective is to extend the scope of our first objective. In the second 
objective, we also consider a financial incentive. What are potential approaches to 
counteract the tax on mental capacity? According to Gneezy et al. (2011), a financial 
incentive can induce greater effort by making the incentivized behavior more attractive 
in monetary terms. Oswald and Backes-Gellner (2014) find, e.g., that students who are 
offered financial incentives for better grades have, on average, better grade point 
averages in the first and second year. In this article, we follow Carpena et al. (2011) and 
introduce a financial incentive for financial literacy test participants. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 






2.3 Experimental design 
We conducted a field experiment between February and May 2014 throughout a 
household survey in the State of Maharashtra, India. In two sub-districts of Pune 
District (Khed and Junnar), we visited 658 households. With the help of Chaitanya, a 
developmental organization from Maharashtra, membership lists for Self-help groups 
(SHGs) were accessed and member households were randomly chosen to participate in 
the experiment and the subsequent survey. We obtained SHG membership lists from the 
sub-districts of Khed and Junnar, which were then used to constitute the pool of 
households with access to financial services from which we drew the sample
4
. We 
obtained separate lists for Khed and Junnar; thus we choose households randomly from 
each of the two lists which yielded our complete sample of 658 households
5
. Chaitanya 
oversees SHGs that are exclusively for women, where savings can be accumulated and 
loans can be taken contracted on individual basis. As the sampled households have at 
least one female SHG member, these households have access to financial services.  
Each household was visited individually. At each household’s residence, the 
respondents were offered the opportunity to participate in the experiment. The 
assignment of each household to either the control group or one of the three treatment 
groups was performed ex ante to the experiment, based on the selected sample 
households from the SHG membership lists. Each respondent was instructed 
accordingly in the assigned treatment and then participated in a test on financial literacy. 
The financial literacy test follows Carpena et al. (2011). We asked ten questions in three 
categories, namely financial awareness, financial attitudes/perceptions and financial 
numeracy
6
. We regard including financial awareness and attitudes/perceptions in 
addition to numeracy questions to capture a more appropriate concept of financial 
literacy, compared with questions based solely on numeracy as in, e.g., in Gaurav and 
Singh (2012), who employ six numeracy questions and one question on risk 
diversification to depict financial literacy. We extend financial literacy to cover 
important aspects such as awareness of budgeting or rates of financial services use. The 
context of the questions relates to the rural environment of the study area. For each 
correctly answered question, the respondent earned one point, leading to a maximum of 
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ten points. This test serves directly to test our two hypotheses, outlined above. 
In addition, we conducted a second test, administered immediately following the 
financial literacy test. The second test was a Raven’s Matrices test to control for effects 
on our respondent’s mental capacity after they participated in the financial literacy test, 
where they were exposed to a treatment. This is of particular importance for our 
hypothesis regarding the financial incentive. Does exposure to the financial incentive 
come at a cost in terms of forgone mental capacity? This cost would contradict the 
intention of employing financial incentives in measures with the aim of promoting 
financial literacy. 
Each respondent’s scores reflect the mental capacity still available after having 
participated in the financial literacy test. Thus, the Raven’s Matrices test provides us 
with a measure of mental capacity. In principal, performance on any other task could 
serve as a measure of the remaining level of mental capacity after being exposed to the 
financial literacy test. The advantage of the Raven’s Matrices test is its level of 
abstraction. It does not require language skills, nor does it assess knowledge learned 
beforehand. The test captures the capacity to think logically and to solve new problems 
(Engle et al. 1999). 
We conducted a standard Raven’s Matrices test with twelve items. Each item presents a 
graphic with a missing part. Below the graphic, multiple choices are provided from 
which the respondent chooses, one of which logically completes the depicted graphic. 
The maximum test score is equal to the number of items, twelve points. 
The experimental treatments were differentiated in the following way: 
1. Tax on mental capacity treatment 
The respondents were instructed that they would complete a test on financial literacy. 
Further, they were instructed that they would be provided with a brief text before the 
test began. The text was read aloud to the respondents by the enumerator. They were 
further informed that they would be asked about their thoughts on that text. The text 
was a brief hypothetical scenario, in which the respondents were asked to imagine that 
they would need to pay a bill for a sudden emergency
7
. 
The tax on mental capacity is pronounced in financial scenarios, meaning that it is 
necessary to expose subjects to a cost (Mullainathan and Shafir 2014). Moreover, Mani 
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et al. (2013) show that a “harder” financial scenario has an even stronger impact on a 
test of cognitive functions. Our treatment, hypothetically, asks the respondent to 
immediately cover a bill of Rs. 50,000. For our sample, SHG-member households from 
India’s Maharashtra State, the latest poverty line refers to Rs. 11,604 per capita, 
annually (Government of Maharashtra, 2014). Thus, our scenario is primarily a financial 
scenario, and because the hypothetical bill equals approximately five times the 
prevailing poverty line, we consider it to be a “financially hard” scenario. 
Moreover, an emergency – a severe road accident in our case – is not uncommon in the 
study area
8
. This familiarity with the scenario facilitates thoughts on similar real 
emergencies to which the respondent may have been exposed. Considering thoughts 
related to personal financial problems triggers a tax on mental capacity, which leads to 
worse performance on the financial literacy test. This is assumed to be a subconscious 
process for the respondent. 
2. Financial incentive treatment  
The respondents in the second treatment group were offered a financial incentive in 
their instructions prior to the financial literacy test. The respondents were informed that 
they would receive Rs. 100 if they responded correctly to at least eight out of ten 
questions in the financial literacy test. We choose eight out of ten correctly answered 
questions as the cutoff for the cash prize to avoid totally demotivating the respondents. 
Further, they were informed that their answers in the second test and the subsequent 
survey would not influence their chances of winning the Rs. 100. This chance was not 
conditional on the second test, as this second test only served to control for whether the 
financial incentive potentially acts as another tax on mental capacity, which would then 
recommend against using the financial incentive in policy applications. 
The effect of a financial incentive depends on its magnitude (Rydval & Ortmann 2004). 
In our sample, the daily wage for working on another’s farm equals approximately Rs. 
150. At roughly 2/3 of the daily farm wage, we consider our incentive level to be 
sufficient. The respondents could earn it with relatively little cost in terms of time, 
compared to an entire day’s work on a farm. Finally, the respondents were instructed 
that the number of correct answers would be calculated immediately after the 
completion of the survey and that the payout would be done immediately in case of 
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3. Financial incentive plus tax on mental capacity treatment (double treatment) 
In this combined treatment, the respondents were also offered a financial incentive in 
their instructions prior to the financial literacy test. The respondents faced the same 
conditions for the incentive as the respondents in the second treatment group. The 
difference from the second treatment group was that the respondents in the third 
treatment were also informed that they would be provided with a brief text, prior to the 
test, on which they were asked to give their thoughts. These were the same conditions 
faced by the respondents in the first treatment group. 
4. Control group 
The control group respondents were simply first asked to participate in the financial 
literacy test and directly thereafter in the Raven’s Matrices test. 
For the experiment to begin, first a respondent was identified in the household and 
asked to sit aside with the enumerator to ensure an undisturbed environment during the 
test phase. In 96% of the households, the respondent was the SHG member woman. The 
respondent was instructed according to one of the treatments and subsequently 
participated in the financial literacy test and the Raven’s Matrices test. Neither test had 
a time limit. When the respondent did not know the answer to a question, the 
enumerator offered to skip the question and continue with the next. The respondents 
were then not allowed to reconsider skipped questions.  
2.4 Methodological approach 
To test the hypotheses, we introduce a poverty measure, which classifies each sample 
household as either poor or non-poor. After dividing the sample into poor and non-poor 
respondents, we compare the test score on the financial literacy test between the poor 
and non-poor groups. We apply t-test comparisons, complemented by Poisson 
regressions as robustness checks. We apply a Poisson regression due to the count data 
nature of our financial literacy test score, which is restricted to whole numbers between 
zero and ten. In addition to the comparison of the financial literacy test, we provide 
comparisons of the Raven’s Matrices test to control for potential influences of the 
treatments on mental capacity. 





the respondent’s household. The survey provides us with the total annual net per capita 
household income. We aggregate the income from selling agricultural and livestock 
produce, from wage income, from self-employment and from other income sources
9
. 
We adjust our income measure by applying OECD adult equivalents to account for 
scale effects within a household
10
. Then, we apply the official poverty line of 
Maharashtra State of Rs. 11,604 per capita per year for the years 2011 to 2012 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2014). Out of the total sample, 658 observations, this 
division leaves us with 262 observations (39.8%) classified as poor and 396 
observations (60.2%) classified as non-poor. 
The sample’s distribution with respect to financial literacy test performance is shown in 
Figure 1. Figure 1 consists of three graphs. In graph 1.1, the distribution of the financial 
literacy test performance is shown for the full sample, in graph 1.2, the data are 
restricted to the poor sub-sample, and in graph 1.3, the data are provided only for the 
non-poor sub-sample. 
The results for the t-test comparison of the financial literacy test scores will be provided 
in the results section below. They will be accompanied by robustness checks in the form 
of Poisson regressions. The Poisson estimation relies on the Poisson distribution.  
We adapt the following form, similar to Wooldridge (2003): 




 , j = 0,1,2,…,m.    (1) 
We depict 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗), the probability that the variable 𝑌𝑖 takes value j for respondent i. 
The maximum value of j is m = 10 for our financial literacy test. The denominator 
depicts j!, j factorial. The distribution depends on the parameter λ, which is the 
arithmetic mean number of incidents described by j. 
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 Income from agricultural and livestock produce, as well as income from self-employment, is net of 
production cost. The category “other” includes income from government schemes, remittances and 
rents from land, buildings, etc. 
10
 For an application, see Klasen (2000): Instead of dividing the total household income by household 
size, each household member is counted as 0.5 if the member is aged below 17 and as 0.7 when aged 
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The Poisson regression function follows a Poisson distribution error term structure and 
can be captured in the following way according to Coxe et al. (2009): 
𝑙𝑛(𝜆𝑖) =  𝛼 +  𝜷𝑿𝑖 +  𝑖,    (2) 
where ln depicts the natural log and 𝜆𝑖 the predicted count, conditional on the given 
values of 𝑿𝑖, which is a vector of variables. The model also includes the constant α and 
the error term 𝑖.We specify two regressions for our count data outcome, namely the 






Equation (3) depicts the outcome variable of the financial literacy test in the poor sub-
sample, 𝑓𝑙 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖, and the three treatment dummies: mc tax, fin inc. and mc tax plus 
fin. inc.. The variables measure the tax on mental capacity, the financial incentive and 
the double treatment of a tax on mental capacity plus the financial incentive, 
respectively.  
Equation (4) depicts again the outcome variable of the financial literacy test, 𝑓𝑙 −
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖, but for the non-poor sub-sample. The three treatment dummies, mc tax, fin inc. 
and mc tax plus fin. inc., are again included, as in Equation (3). 
In addition to the above-presented basic regression specifications, we will include 
specifications, in which we control for potential differences across the four experimental 
groups. In these specifications, we include variables for which the t-test results in Table 
3 (see the preceding page) show differences across the experimental groups. 
 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑓𝑙 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖) =  𝛼
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 +  𝑚𝑐 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖  𝛽1











𝑙𝑛 (𝑓𝑙 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖) =  𝛼
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 +  𝑚𝑐 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖  𝛽1
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 +  𝑓𝑖𝑛. 𝑖𝑛𝑐.𝑖  𝛽2
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The mean comparisons of the financial literacy test scores are provided in the following. 
The results are presented in Table 4. We focus on the poor sub-sample. We find that the 
respondents in the Mental capacity tax treatment score significantly lower than the 
Control group, by approximately 0.5 points. The respondents in the Financial incentive 
treatment score significantly higher compared to the Control group, by approximately 
0.4 points. The third treatment, the double treatment of Mental capacity tax and 
financial incentive shows no significant difference from the Control group. Further, for 
the poor, the coefficient of the third treatment, the double treatment of Tax on mental 
capacity and financial incentive, seems to be a net effect of the two single treatments, 
namely Tax on mental capacity and Financial incentive. The difference from the 
Control group is approximately 0.2. In this treatment, the respondents scored lower than 
the Control group, but not as much lower like the respondents in the Mental capacity 
tax treatment (0.5) do in comparison to the Control group. Nevertheless, the double 
treatment’s difference from the Control group remains insignificant. For comparative  
Table 4. T-test comparison financial literacy test score 
     






Treatment 3: Mental 
capacity tax plus 
financial incentive 
(double treatment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sub-sample Poor     
Financial literacy test score 7.42 6.90** 7.83** 7.18 
 (1.06) (1.39) (1.30) (1.95) 
Observations 71 63 60 67 
     
     
Sub-sample Non-poor     
Financial literacy test score 7.10 7.43* 7.77*** 7.74*** 
 (1.36) (1.29) (1.48) (1.55) 
Observations 98 97 104 95 
Source: Author’s estimation based on survey data. 
Mean values are shown with standard deviation in parentheses. Each treatment group is compared to the Control 
group. Significance: *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. 
 
reasons, the treatment effects for the non-poor sub-sample are also provided. The 
Mental capacity tax treatment shows no negative effect here; instead respondents in the 
Mental capacity tax treatment score higher than the Control group, and the differences 
is slightly significant. The effects of the Financial incentive treatment and the double 
treatment are similar: The respondents in these two treatments score significantly higher 
than the Control group, by approximately 0.7 points and 0.6 points, respectively.  





the four experimental groups, we apply a Poisson regression. The Poisson regression 
output is attached in Appendix 2.3. Here, we refer to Table 5, which provides the 
marginal effects (at means) of the Poisson estimates. The marginal effects in Table 5 
use the same scale as the differences in the t-test results from Table 4, thereby 
facilitating the comparison of our treatment effects. 
In Table 5, we provide the marginal effects from six regression specifications. Specifi-
cations (1) and (2) include only the three treatment dummies, separately for the poor 
and non-poor sub-samples. In specifications (3) to (6), we add variables to control for 
differences across the four experimental groups. In specifications (3) and (4), we only 
include the sociodemographic controls, whereas in specifications (5) and (6), we also 
include controls related to income. 
The effect of the Tax on mental capacity treatment confirms the results from the t-test 
comparison, provided in Table 4: For the poor sub-sample, the respondents in the Tax 
on mental capacity treatment group score significantly lower than those in the Control 
group, by approximately 0.5 points. This effect remains stable across all specifications 
for the poor sub-sample, specifications (1), (3) and (5). The effect of the Financial 
incentive treatment also remains stable for the poor sub-sample across specifications 
(1), (3) and (5). The effect size (ca. 0.4) is again of similar magnitude to the result from 
the t-test comparison. 
Moreover, specifications (3) and (5) show that for the poor sub-sample, being male is 
associated with weaker performance on the financial literacy test. Overall, for the poor 
sub-sample, the regressions show similar results to the t-test comparisons. For the non-
poor sub-sample – specifications (2), (4) and (6) – the regressions also confirm the 
results from the t-test: The Tax on mental capacity treatment shows no negative effect 
on financial literacy test performance, and both the Financial incentive treatment and 
the double treatment show a positive effect, of similar magnitude, on financial literacy 
test performance. 
We cannot exclude the possibility that endogeneity in the control variables may bias our 
treatment effects in the regression specifications. In particular, the income-related 
controls might lead to biased effects. Activities, such as selling crops or receiving 
income from other sources may influence the level of financial literacy. However, 
throughout all regression specifications, the treatment effects confirm the results from 





tax on mental capacity negatively affects the level of financial literacy and that a 
financial incentive positively influences the level of financial literacy, for the poor and 
the non-poor alike. 
 
Table 5. Financial literacy test scores – Marginal effects (at means) of Poisson estimates 




– only socioeconomic 
and income-related 
variables 
 Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax on mental capacity Dummy -0.510 0.407 -0.504 0.327 -0.537 0.320 
 (2.31)** (1.96)* (2.26)** (1.62) (2.36)** (1.58) 
Financial incentive Dummy 0.414 0.738 0.421 0.674 0.362 0.680 
 (2.07)** (3.47)*** (2.07)** (3.30)*** (1.72)* (3.27)*** 
Tax on mental capacity and financial 
incentive Dummy 
-0.224 0.707 -0.265 0.642 -0.301 0.652 
 (0.83) (3.18)*** (0.94) (3.01)*** (1.05) (3.08)*** 
Male Dummy   -0.764 -0.093 -0.750 -0.128 
   (2.56)** (0.25) (2.54)** (0.34) 
Being married Dummy   -0.358 0.332 -0.315 0.330 
   (1.11) (1.54) (0.96) (1.52) 
Muslim Dummy   0.071 -0.122 0.013 -0.183 
   (0.16) (0.59) (0.03) (0.85) 
Scheduled caste Dummy   -0.606 -0.378 -0.568 -0.376 
   (1.50) (1.18) (1.35) (1.19) 
Other backward class Dummy   0.230 0.184 0.207 0.184 
   (1.09) (1.04) (0.98) (1.01) 
No. of household members   0.016 0.039 0.034 0.036 
   (0.42) (1.18) (0.81) (1.09) 
Farmer Dummy     0.052 -0.032 
     (0.18) (0.16) 
Crop sales Dummy     -0.034 0.018 
     (0.18) (0.08) 
Income from other sources Dummy     0.170 -0.466 
     (0.61) (1.21) 
Land owned in acres     -0.057 -0.033 
     (1.22) (0.86) 
Observations 262 396 261 389 261 388 
Source: Author’s estimation based on survey data. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The number of observations within the same subsample specification differs due to missings in the data. 
 
2.6 Controlling for effects on mental capacity  
In the following, we test whether the results from Section 2.5 have implications for the 
mental capacity of the respondents. The focus is on the Financial incentive treatment 
for the poor sub-sample. In Section 2.5, we report the result that the financial incentive 
positively affects the level of financial literacy among the poor. However, this finding is 
only worthy of consideration for policy applications if it does not negatively affect the 
respondent’s mental capacity. If the financial incentive incudes greater effort, does it 
require more self-control from the respondent, in turn requiring a higher share of mental 
capacity? According to Spears (2011), poverty can lead to diminished behavioral 
control. Similarly, Vohs (2013) argues that if one continuously exercises self-control, 





that poverty exerts particular demands on a person’s self-control, and thus a poor person 
is more likely to lose self-control “faster” than a non-poor person. 
Table 6 provides the t-test comparison for the Raven’s Matrices test score, our measure 
of mental capacity. It reveals no significant negative effect of the Financial incentive 
treatment for the poor sub-sample. The average respondent score in that treatment is 
even higher than that in the Control group. Thus, we find that exposure to the financial 
incentive does not demand further mental capacity from the poor. See Appendix 2.4 for 
a Poisson regression as robustness check. 
Table 6. T-test comparison Raven’s Matrices test score 
     








tax plus financial 
incentive (double 
treatment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sub-sample Poor     
Raven’s Matrices test score 7.08 6.75 7.72* 6.90 
 (2.06) (1.90) (2.25) (2.13) 
Observations 71 63 60 67 
     
     
Sub-sample Non-poor     
Raven’s Matrices test score 7.20 7.35 7.40 7.47 
 (2.05) (2.32) (2.04) (2.13) 
Observations 98 97 104 95 
Source: Author’s estimation based on survey data. 
Mean values are shown with standard deviation in parentheses. Each treatment group is compared to the 
Control group. Significance: *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. 
 
2.7 Discussion and policy implications 
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, we find evidence of a causal link 
between a tax on mental capacity and financial literacy. We find that, in the context of 
poverty, financial literacy is negatively affected by a tax on mental capacity. Second, we 
provide evidence for a positive influence of a financial incentive on the level of 
financial literacy. The effect holds for the poor and non-poor alike. The results imply 
that although the poor’s financial literacy seems to be negatively affected by a tax on 
mental capacity, it can also be positively affected by a financial incentive. The financial 
incentive thus has the potential to compensate for the forgone financial literacy imposed 
by the tax on mental capacity. Furthermore, we are able to confirm that the financial 
incentive does not negatively affect overall mental capacity and thus does not translate 





The policy implications of our findings are twofold. First, in line with the World Bank 
(2015), we agree that policies might have a greater impact if one acknowledges that 
poverty can act as a tax on mental capacity and that, consequently, the target population 
is assisted in making financial decisions. Assistance can, e.g., be provided in decisions 
regarding the timing of taking a loan, the loan volume, the number of parallel loans, the 
source of the loan, and so forth. Financial decisions may promote poverty reduction 
when competent assistance is made available to individuals with relatively lower 
financial literacy in poor regions. An example of a problem for individuals with low 
financial literacy is provided by Beck et al. (2005), who show that bank paperwork can 
pose an obstacle to clients. If a tax on mental capacity prevents the target population 
from properly completing a required enrolment form, a person who assists in 
completing the form can significantly improve the proper use of financial services. 
Second, in addition to acknowledging taxes on mental capacity and the resulting need to 
assist those who are affected, we suggest that it is worth exploring going beyond 
assistance and to increase the level of financial literacy of those affected by such mental 
burdens. We do not suggest that the only thing poor people require is a financial 
incentive to obtain the financial literacy necessary to undertake decisions that shape 
their path out of poverty. We do find, however, that one means of counteracting the tax 
on mental capacity, namely a financial incentive, can be beneficial for poor individuals 
affected by the tax. One possible field of application is financial literacy training. Here, 
Cole et al. (2011), among others, show that subsidizing bank accounts can increase 
demand for such accounts and that financial literacy training is unable to increase bank 
account demand. Doi et al. (2014) find that the effect of financial literacy training on 
financial knowledge, behavior and savings varies according to the composition of the 
participant group. Their experiment grouped migrants and their family members in 
different ways. Drexler et al. (2014) find that simplified rule-of-thumb training is 
superior to standard accounting training. The rule-of-thumb training improved a firm’s 
financial practices, objective reporting quality, and revenues. The standard accounting 
training did not affect these outcomes. Bruhn et al. (2014) test the effect of financial 
incentives, offered to potential participants beforehand, on the uptake of a financial 
literacy education program. We suggest exploring whether such trainings are more 
successful in increasing financial literacy when incorporating financial incentives for, 





Moreover, conditional cash-transfer systems can potentially lead to increases in 
financial literacy. In such systems, conditional on fulfilling a target, a person receives 
cash
11
. The money can be used to meet financial obligations. Poor persons in particular 
may experience relief if some of their pressing financial obligations are met. Thus, their 
mental capacity may be less taxed and their financial literacy less affected. In turn, they 
would be better able to undertake financial decisions to overcome poverty. Hence, we 
argue for conditional cash-transfer systems as a potential means to promote financial 
literacy among the poor. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This article provides experimental evidence that a tax on mental capacity and a financial 
incentive have effects on financial literacy. We suggest that outcomes of financial 
decisions can be better understood if the tax on mental capacity, stemming from 
poverty, and the potential for financial incentives are taken into account. Our findings 
only allow limited generalization, as we only report results from a particular sample at 
one point in time. Further research is necessary to test the robustness of our findings 
over time and in other regions. 
Moreover, the responsiveness of respondents with respect to the treatment design needs 
to be elicited in further studies. For example, does the treatment effect of the financial 
incentive vary when the financial incentive is lowered or increased? Similarly, variation 
in the treatment of the tax on mental capacity needs to be studied further to elucidate 
lower and upper bounds of our effect. 
Nevertheless, this article contributes to explaining the importance of two particular 
factors that influence financial literacy, an important means of welfare development, 
particularly in the developing world. 
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Appendix 2.1: Financial literacy test 
Our financial literacy test closely follows the questions from Carpena et al. (2011). We use the 
following questions: 
 
I. Basic Financial Awareness 
 
1. Shantiben is preparing a budget for her household. Which of the following needs to be 
included in the budget? 
 
A. Income only 
B. Expenses only 
C. Both 
D. Don’t know 
 




C. Don’t know 
 
3. Sukhiben’s expenses are more than her income. Her friend Najmabanu tells her that writing a 




C. Don’t know 
 
4. Iqbalbhai is 20 years old and Ashokbhai is 30 years old. If they were to buy life insurance for 
20 years, who between the two to your mind will have to pay higher premium? 
 
A. 20 year old Iqbalbhai will have to pay a higher premium 






II. Financial Attitudes and Perceptions 
 
1. Rameshbhai does plastering on tall buildings. It is a dangerous job and he is worried that if he 
gets injured his family’s income will become inadequate to meet their needs. If Rameshbhai 
comes to you for advice what would you suggest? 
 
A. Quit job 
B. Purchase health/life/ accident insurance 
C. Increase savings 
D. Don’t know 
 
2. Nareshbhai currently drives a rented auto rickshaw. Driving the auto rickshaw will definitely 
be a profitable business in the coming years in Nareshbhai’s city. He wants to purchase his own 
auto rickshaw but does not have the money and is considering taking out a loan for the same. If 





C. Don’t know 
 
3. Sajidbhai recently got married. He and his wife are considering buying a TV. They do not 
have enough savings and will need to take out a loan. Sajidbhai has two options: (1) He can take 
a loan from the moneylender and a relative and get a bigger amount in loan to buy a big TV, or 
(2) He can take a loan only from a relative and buy a smaller TV. 
What would you advise Sajidbhai and his wife? 
 
A. Take loans from the moneylender and a relative and buy a big TV 
B. Take a loan only from the relative and buy a smaller TV 






III. Financial Numeracy Skills 
 
1. Suppose you had Rs. 50 to save. You could either save this for 1 month in an account which 
earns 2 percent interest per month, or save it for 1 month in an account that earns 0.75 percent 
interest per week. 
Which would you choose? 
 
A. 2 percent per month  
B. 0.75 percent per week 
C. Don’t know 
 
2. Assume you have purchased a medical insurance policy and suffer an accident which results 
in Rs. 3,500 of hospital fees. Would you be better off if you had purchased an insurance policy 
with 
 
A. Rs. 3,000 cover and Rs. 950 premium 
B. Rs. 2,800 cover and Rs. 900 premium 
C. Don’t know 
 
3. We would like to tell you a short story about the income and expenditures of a tailor. We 
would then like you to use this sheet on the next page to determine if in a month, this tailor is 
saving money or if his monthly expenditures exceed his monthly income. 
 
Jerembhai is a tailor in Vasna. Each week he makes Rs. 1,500 from his work. He also sells the 
scraps from his work, for this he earns Rs. 200 each week. Each month Jerembhai must pay Rs. 
1,000 for the rent of his shop. He also spends Rs. 200 per week on his food and household 
goods. In addition to this he spends about Rs. 50 per week on tea and snacks. He must pay Rs. 
500 each month for the education expenses of his children. Some time ago, Jerembhai took a 
loan to purchase his sewing machine. He pays an installment of Rs. 250 each week for this loan. 
He also pays Rs. 150 per month for a life insurance policy. 
 
A. Expenditures exceed income 










For enumerator: Sit directly next to the respondent and read the following 
 
1. This is a 10-question test on financial literacy 
2. I will sit next to you and read every question to you 
3. If you have clarification questions please ask me 
4. I will not give you any help in answering the questions 
5. When you have fully understood the question, tell me the answer [mark the answer 
on the sheet] 
6. After you have answered the question, we will proceed to the next question 
7. Once we proceed, we can’t return back 
8. If you don’t know the answer and want to go to the next question tell me 
9. Do you have any questions before we start? 
10. For the duration of the test, nobody will interrupt us; please ensure a undisturbed 
condition now 
11. Before we proceed to the test questions, I will read to you a short text and ask you 
to give your considerations on that 





I will now read the following text to you, please take your time understanding it carefully. I 
can also repeat.  
 
 
1. Imagine that through a road accident your aunt is hit hard. 
2. She is immediately brought to the closest hospital. 
3. The treatment requires your household an immediate expense of Rs. 50,000. 
4. Are there ways in which you may be able to come up with that amount of money on 
a very short notice? 
5. How would you go about it? 
6. Would it cause you long lasting financial hardship? 
7. Would it require you to make sacrifices that have long term consequences? 
8. If so, what kind of sacrifices? 
 
 
9. Please now note down your considerations here! Tell me when you are ready, latest 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































WOMEN’S LOAN CONTROL AND THE HOUSEHOLD’S INVESTMENT 
BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF WOMEN’S SELF-HELP GROUP LOANS AND 






Self-help groups (SHGs) have substantially increased access to credit. In particular, 
rural India has witnessed a tremendous increase in access to credit for women through 
SHGs. However, access to and control over credit are not synonymous, and it is not 
necessarily the case that SHG member women enjoy both. We explore the relevance of 
SHG member women’s level of loan control for their household’s investment decisions. 
We study the case of agricultural investments, a male domain in India. Due to its 
productive nature, agricultural investment promises welfare improvements for the 
investing households. We find that the likelihood of investing the funds from an SHG 
loan in agriculture decreases with increasing loan control by women over their SHG 
loans. The implications of that inverse relationship are twofold. First, with a decreasing 
level of women’s loan control, the households are more likely to invest in a domain 
over which the women have no say. The women bear the responsibility for repaying the 
loan but can no longer control the borrowed sum anymore to generate the funds for 
repayment. This may impede their ability to repay the loan to the SHG. Second, the lent 
funds nevertheless flow into a productive domain that promises welfare improvements 
from which the whole household can potentially benefit. The inverse relationship we 
observe is interpreted as a tradeoff between women’s loan control and potential benefits 
for the whole household. Suggestions to resolve the tradeoff are discussed. 
 
Keywords: financial decision making; credit; agricultural investment; women 
empowerment; Self-help groups; microfinance 
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In the developing world, women are seen to be relatively more credit constrained than 
are men (Agier & Szafarz, 2013; Fletschner, 2009). Further, women are a better credit 
risk than men (Boehe & Cruz, 2013; D’Espallier et al., 2011). The formation of Self-
help groups (SHGs) exclusively for women to obtain credit is thus potentially beneficial 
for the women, their families and the institutions that exclusively target such women. 
According to Galab and Rao (2003), participation in SHGs has improved women’s 
access to credit and helped to reduce their dependence on moneylenders. In 2009, the 
share of women among all microfinance clients worldwide amounted to approximately 
73% (Reed, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment remains 
inconclusive (see, e.g., Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 2001; Holvoet, 2005; Weber & Ahmad, 
2014; Pitt et al., 2006; Garikipati, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2015). Women’s empowerment 
is important as an end in itself, and moreover, it may function as a means for economic 
development (Duflo, 2012). However, a common view in the literature on women’s 
empowerment argues that women may not control their SHG loans personally, despite 
that, in general, the women benefit in terms of improved access to credit (Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999). Similar to Garikipati (2008) and Garikipati (2013), we 
argue that it is crucial to distinguish between pure access to and control over credit. It 
remains unclear how a loan is utilized when taken in the name of an SHG member 
women but controlled by, e.g., her male spouse.  
As an illustrative case we will restrict our attention to loan utilization for agricultural 
investments. Similar to Zeller (2006), we stress the role of rural finance for agricultural 
development. We argue that agricultural investments matter for development, as they 
have the potential to increase productivity, which may lead to income increases. The 
literature shows that household investments in agriculture can benefit households in 
monetary terms and are hence welfare promoting. According to Udry and Anagol 
(2006), investment in pineapple cultivation in Ghana generates high returns. Wollni and 
Zeller (2007) show that farmers in Costa Rica receive higher prices when growing and 
selling specialty coffee. According to Kleemann et al. (2014) and Asfaw et al. (2009) 
farmer’s investment into standards in Kenya can boost income, respectively can bring a 
positive return on investment in Ghana. According to Khandker and Koolwal (2015), 





their income from livestock rearing and promotes income diversification. Furthermore, 
they find that (credit) supply-side constraints reduce crop income. In India, it remains 
crucial to increase the incomes of poor rural households. The poverty indicators are 
worse in rural than in urban areas in India. Recent statistics, for the year 2011, provided 
by the World Bank (2016) indicate that the rural poverty head-count ratio amounts to 
25.7%, compared to the urban ratio of 13.7%, while for the whole country, the ratio is 
21.9%. 
Investigating women’s level of loan control is important for two reasons. First, 
women’s level of loan control may have consequences for their ability to repay the loan. 
If women do control the borrowed funds, they cannot use the loan to generate the funds 
necessary for loan repayment. This may impair their credit risk reputation and thus can 
reduce the likelihood of obtaining further loans. Second, when the investment activity is 
productive in nature, the whole household and thus, at least indirectly, the SHG women 
can potentially benefit from the returns on the investment. 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on agricultural investments has not yet 
rigorously addressed SHG member women’s loan control as a potential influential 
factor
13
. The econometric study most similar to ours, conducted by Garikipati (2008), 
reports mixed results. An increase in women’s SHG loan control decreases the 
household’s likelihood of using the loan for working capital for the family’s farm or 
enterprise and does not significantly affect the likelihood of investing in family land. 
Moreover, the effect on family land investments is also negative. The investment 
category of working capital for the family’s farm or enterprise employed by Garikipati 
(2008) does not restrict the loan’s purpose to be solely related to agriculture. Enterprise 
investments and farm investments may be differentially affected by women’s level of 
loan control. The business in which the family enterprises engage is not further defined. 
In contrast, we will define the investment purpose to be solely related to agriculture in 
our analysis and will test the extent to which it is influenced by SHG member women’s 
level of loan control. Moreover, the results from Garikipati (2008) may be biased by 
endogeneity, what we do consider in our study. 
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In the following, we will introduce our conceptual discussion (Section 3.2), the SHG 
model and our data (Section 3.3), and the methods used (Section 3.4). These topics are 
followed by descriptive statistics (Section 3.5) and our econometric results (Section 
3.6). In Section 3.7, we elaborate on our suggested policy measures, and we conclude 
with our findings in Section 3.8. 
3.2 Conceptual discussion 
The literature shows that women and men invest differently. Khandker and Koolwal 
(2015) find that in Bangladesh, nonfarm income growth for marginal farmers increased 
through borrowing by both men and women, whereas for larger farms, only men’s 
borrowing lead to income increases. Pitt and Khandker (1998) show that poor 
households increased their consumption expenditure by participating in a credit 
program to a greater extent when women participated in the program, relative to the 
case of men’s program participation. Similarly, Menon et al. (2011) find that the impact 
of access to credit differs between men and women: Access to credit encouraged 
women’s own account self-employment activities and discouraged men’s unpaid family 
activities. 
Investment in agriculture is rather regarded as investment in a domain controlled by 
men in India. Land, a major factor for agricultural production, is typically controlled by 
men, as access to land rights remains difficult for women in India (Agarwal, 2003; 
Agarwal, 1995; Agarwal, 1988). However, according to Upadhyay (2005), with regard 
to labor input, women spend more hours on agricultural activities than men do. 
Nevertheless, women face categorical exclusion from equal shares in the benefits from 
agricultural production. Upadhyay (2005) relates this to male control over marketing 
activities such as finding a buyer, negotiating the price or transporting the produce to 
market, which are activities traditionally dominated by men in India. 
Thus, we would expect women not to invest in agriculture, as their level of control in 
that domain may be relatively more limited than men’s. Nevertheless, in our sample of 
SHG member households, we find agricultural investments to be the most prominent 
category
14
. Out of 317 SHG loan purposes, 132 (41.6%) are devoted to agriculture. 
As mentioned above, Goetz and Gupta (1996) find that women’s degree of loan control 
varies by the nature of the investment activity. This relationship is the focus of our 
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study: The link between a woman’s control over her SHG loan and the likelihood that 
this loan is invested in agriculture. In an SHG that exclusively admits female 
membership, formally, a woman receives the loan from the SHG. We hypothesize the 
following: The higher the SHG women’s level of loan control, the less likely a 
household is to invest that loan in agriculture. As an increasing level of women’s 
control entails that men’s degree of control diminishes, we also expect the relevant 
investment outcome, male-dominated agriculture, to become less likely with increasing 
loan control by women. 
3.3 The SHG model and the data  
The model of SHGs became prominent thanks to the efforts of Muhammad Yunus, who 
founded Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 1983 (Yunus, 1999). Inherent to that model are 
group lending and peer monitoring. Thus, relative to formal banking, this model could 
more effectively address adverse selection of bad credit risks and moral hazard because 
the responsibility for screening and monitoring the members lies with the group itself 
(Ghatak, 1999). 
The governmental organization Chaitanya operates throughout Maharashtra, India and 
supports the formation of SHGs, which it governs through a hierarchical model that is 
outlined below (Chaitanya, 2015). The groups meet monthly and consist of ten to 20 
women. Above the groups, clusters supervise between 15 and 20 SHGs. The top level of 
governance is exercised through federations that than act as institutions to provide 
financial services to the lower levels. A given federation has responsibility for 
governing 200 to 400 SHGs. The federations are linked to formal banks for refinancing. 
In India, the most prominent model of linking SHGs to formal sources of refinance is 
the SHG-bank linkage program initiated by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) in 1992 (Karmakar, 2008). Under this program, NABARD 
serves as the apex institution for rural financial institutions and refinances them. 
In Chaithanya’s SHGs, the member women can take loans on an individual basis and 
accumulate savings. As of March 2015, Chaitanya and partner NGOs govern 112,870 
women in 8,772 SHGs and administer Rs. 273,696,371 in outstanding loans (Chaitanya, 
2015). Between February and May 2014, we conducted a household survey in two sub-
districts of Pune District, namely Khed and Junnar. Pune District belongs to the Indian 





women’s SHGs for these two sub-districts
15
. We obtained separate lists for Khed and 
Junnar; thus we chose households randomly from each of the two lists, which amounted 
to our complete sample of 658 households
16
. We applied a structured questionnaire. 
In approximately 96% of our sample households, the SHG member served as the 
respondent. Thus, we expect that our data reflect the women’s view, despite that in 4% 
of the cases, the respondent was not the SHG women. The respondent was asked 
whether the household had taken a loan (from any source) within the last twelve 
months. Moreover, in the event that the household had taken a loan, we further asked 
after the purpose of the loan and the gender of the person who controls the borrowed 
funds. Such control could be exercised by the borrower alone, by another household 
member, or jointly by the borrower and the spouse. Section 3.5 will describe credit 
activities in detail. 
3.4 Method 
To test our hypothesis, we will estimate the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture. 
We draw on econometric techniques to identify causality and to control for potential 
endogeneity bias. We begin with a univariate probit model in Section 3.4.1. In Section 
3.4.2, we address the potential selection bias. In Section 3.4.3, we apply an IV probit 
model to account for the potential endogeneity of our main explanatory variable, a SHG 
member women’s level of loan control. The last model specification in Section 3.4.4 
includes two binary measures of women’s loan control. This provides an alternative 
specification to that one in Section 3.4.1, where we rely on an ordinally scaled measure 
for SHG member women’s level of loan control. All model specifications will be 
elaborated below. 
3.4.1 Univariate probit model 
We estimate the likelihood of investing SHG credit in agriculture using a probit model. 
Similar to Mishra and Morehart (2001), we model the binary outcome: 
𝑌𝑖
∗ =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑿𝑖 + 𝑖     (5) 
As we model the likelihood of investing the proceeds from SHG loans, the sample is 
restricted to those households that had taken a SHG loan and excludes households that 
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took no SHG loans. For each household (i), we observe the binary outcome variable 
SHG credit investment in agriculture, referred to as 𝑌𝑖. The latent variable 𝑌𝑖
∗ remains 
unobserved. We model 𝑌𝑖 = 1 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0 and 𝑌𝑖 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ ≤ 0. When 𝑌𝑖 = 1, this refers to 
the case in which the household currently has devoted an ongoing SHG loan to 
agriculture in one or more of the following categories: Agricultural land, farm 
equipment, animals, fertilizer, seeds, farm buildings, product/process certification or 
land title/certification; otherwise, 𝑌𝑖 = 0. In the model, 𝛽1 represents the coefficient for 
the main control variable 𝐶𝑖 (an SHG woman’s level of control over her SHG loan), 
𝛽2 refers to the parameter vector of further explanatory variables 𝑿𝑖, α describes the 
constant, and 𝑖 is the error term. 
Similar to Garikipati (2013), we model women’s loan control independently of a loan’s 
purpose. We apply an ordinal scale with three levels. For the lowest level, 𝐶𝑖 = 0, the 
women exhibits no control at all over her loan. In this case, another, male household 
member fully controls the loan. At the intermediate level, 𝐶𝑖 = 1, the women exhibits 
partial control over the loan. Her male spouse also exhibits partial control, but we 
cannot further differentiate the degree of each spouse’s influence here. For the highest 
level, 𝐶𝑖 = 2, the SHG woman fully controls the loan with no male influence. The 
further explanatory variables, captured by the vector 𝑿𝑖, will be discussed below. 
Summary statistics will be provided below after all model specifications are introduced. 
To cover potential sociodemographic influences on our outcome, we include Male head 
(dummy), Age of head (in years), Education of head (in years), Education of SHG 
woman (in years), Age of SHG woman (in years), Hindu household (dummy), General 
caste (dummy) and Household size (in members). According to the literature, which 
regards agriculture as a male domain, we expect the Male head (dummy) variable to 
increase the likelihood of investing loan proceeds in agriculture (see, e.g., Agarwal, 
2003 on the topic of land rights and gender in India). Further, we expect that Age of 
head (in years) may negatively influence our outcome measure, as older farmers may be 
less inclined to invest (Feder, 1992). Moreover, we expect Education of head (in years) 
to positively influence the likelihood of agricultural investments. To control for the 
bargaining power in loan control for the SHG women, we include Education of SHG 
woman (in years) and Age of SHG woman (in years). To capture exposure to 
information, we include Respondent never reads newspaper (dummy). Here, we expect 
that households that are less exposed to information according to our measure to be less 





in agriculture. We also include Respondent is risky (dummy). This binary measure is 
derived from a hypothetical risk game in which the respondent was offered two options. 
Option 1 was to take Rs. 100 without any risk. Option 2 was to take a 50% chance of 
winning Rs. 300 or losing Rs. 100. In the case of Option 2, a coin was flipped to 
determine the outcome. The risk variable is coded 1 if the respondent chose Option 2, 0 
otherwise. We expect our risk measure to positively influence the likelihood of 
investing credit in agriculture, as agricultural investments can entail risk (Karlan et al., 
2014; Weber & Musshoff, 2012; Weber & Musshoff, 2013; Takeshima & Yamauchi, 
2012). To control for differences with respect to religion, Hindu household (dummy) is 
included. Moreover, General caste (dummy) is added as a control. This category is the 
remainder after the identification of other caste categories that are eligible for 
governmental support (see, e.g., GOI, 2014 for the categorizations). Thus, the General 
caste (dummy) variable taking value 1 may represent the better-off households, which 
might lead to differentials in the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture. Finally, at 
the household level, we control for household size. 
Moreover, we include two distance variables to capture the level of infrastructure in our 
sample region. We include Next market for agric. produce (in km) and Taluka main city 
(in km). For Next market for agric. produce (in km), we expect a positive relationship 
with our outcome measure. Due to lower agricultural productivity in more remote areas, 
the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture may be positively related with the degree 
of remoteness (Stifel & Minten, 2008). Because of diminishing marginal gains in the 
productivity of investments, we expect that the likelihood of investing in agriculture is 
higher where the agricultural productivity is lower. Households with a relatively higher 
potential productivity increase would benefit more from an investment than households 
with relatively lower potential productivity increases. Thus, we expect investments to be 
made where the benefits are relatively higher. In our sample, all households have access 
to credit; thus all households, independent of the degree of remoteness, have the chance 
to invest. The second distance variable, Taluka main city (in km), controls for the 
influence of main city infrastructure that offers, e.g., a variety of off-farm employment 
opportunities, health infrastructure and general consumption opportunities. 
Finally, we include a proxy for the agricultural activity of a household as a potential 
predictor of agricultural investments. We include Land owned by the household five 





The model in equation (5) may suffer from endogeneity bias, stemming from two 
sources. First, those households that take an SHG loan may systematically differ from 
those that do not. The error term 𝑖, included in equation (5), captures unobserved 
characteristics. These may include the ability and motivation of household members, 
which may make those households more likely to take an SHG loan and may, 
simultaneously, also positively affect our outcome, the likelihood of investing credit 
into agriculture. Thus, selection bias may lead to an overestimation of our effects. 
Second, the effect of the main explanatory variable, an SHG woman’s level of control, 
may also be biased due to endogeneity. Unobserved household characteristics such as 
traditional gender roles may influence our outcome measure. Moreover, in addition to 
this endogeneity bias stemming from unobserved factors, the effect of the SHG 
woman’s level of control may be biased by endogeneity stemming from reverse 
causality. The dependent variable, SHG credit investment in agriculture, is one purpose 
for which an SHG loan may be used. There are also other purposes; see Section 3.5 for 
an overview. We cannot exclude the possibility that the purpose to which the household 
puts the loan may also influence our main explanatory variable, women’s level of SHG 
loan control. The male spouse may be more inclined to increase his level of loan control 
if the loan is to be invested in agriculture, a male domain. Similar to Lambrecht et al. 
(2016), we separately address the potential sources of endogeneity bias. First, to reduce 
the selection bias, we apply a bivariate probit model that takes sample selection into 
account, and second, to reduce the bias stemming from the potentially endogenous 
regressor 𝐶𝑖, we employ an IV probit model that instruments our main explanatory 
variable 𝐶𝑖, the level of control an SHG woman has over her loan. 
3.4.2 Bivariate probit model with sample selection 
The household’s decision-making process for SHG loans is modeled to consist of two 
decisions. The first decision concerns whether to take a loan with the SHG, and the 
second decision regards choosing the purpose of the loan. Those households that opt to 
take an SHG loan may differ from those that do not due to unobserved characteristics, 
as discussed above. To account for potential selection bias in our estimates, we estimate 
the likelihood of using credit for agriculture with bivariate probit models with sample 
selection (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981; Lambrecht et al. 2014). Similar to Kersting 








∗ =  𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑿𝑖2 + 𝑖2, 𝑌𝑖2 = 1 if 𝑌𝑖2
∗ >  0, 𝑌𝑖2 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖2
∗ ≤ 0  (6) 
Selection equation: 
𝑌𝑖1
∗ = 𝛼1 +  𝜇1 𝑿𝑖1 +  𝜇2𝑀𝑖 +  𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖1 = 1 if 𝑌𝑖1
∗ >  0, 𝑌𝑖1 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖1
∗ ≤ 0   (7) 
𝑖1, 𝑖2 ~ BVN(0,0,1,1, 𝜌), Var[ 𝑖1] =  Var[ 𝑖2] = 1,    
𝐶𝑜𝑣 [ 𝑖1, 𝑖2] = 𝜌,    
(𝑌𝑖2, 𝑋𝑖2, C𝑖  is observed only when 𝑌𝑖1 = 1),     
where 𝑌𝑖1
∗  and 𝑌𝑖2
∗  remain unobserved or latent. In the outcome equation, 𝛽1 describes 
the coefficient for the main explanatory loan control variable, 𝐶𝑖. This is similar to 
equation (5). The vector of control variables is modeled as 𝑿𝑖2, and the corresponding 
parameter vector is denoted 𝛽2. In equation (7), 𝜇1 refers to the parameter vector of the 
control variable vector 𝑿𝑖1, which comprises the same variables as 𝑿𝑖2. In addition, the 
variable 𝑀𝑖 and its corresponding coefficient 𝜇2 are included in equation (7) as an 
exclusion restriction, which will be elaborated on below. In both equations (6) and (7), 
𝛼1 and 𝛼2 refer to the constants and 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 to the error terms. The error terms, 
𝑖1, 𝑖2, are distributed bivariate normal with zero mean, unit variance and correlation 𝜌. 
Similar to equation (5), 𝑌𝑖2 is a binary outcome variable in equation (6), the outcome 
equation. In the model of utilizing credit for agriculture, 𝑌𝑖2 = 1 if household i decides 
to devote an SHG loan to an agricultural purposes, 0 otherwise. In the selection 
equation, equation (7), 𝑌𝑖1 = 1 if household i is taking a loan at the SHG, 0 otherwise. 
The bivariate probit model with sample selection provides more robust estimations if an 
exclusion restriction is imposed, as the exclusion restriction may reduce the collinearity 
of covariates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Accordingly, the selection equation requires 
an additional variable that is excluded from the outcome equation. This variable should 
have a significant influence on the probability of selection and no direct influence on the 
outcome of the outcome equation. 
We include an additional regressor, 𝑀𝑖, in the selection equation that captures the 
likelihood of taking a SHG loan. The regressor 𝑀𝑖 describes the SHG membership (in 
years) of the SHG member women in the selection equations. After the formation of an 
SHG, it is unknown how long the group will exist. According to Giné and Karlan 





dissolved after two to five years. Holvoet (2005) states that it is common for women to 
take their loans near the beginning of their membership. 
Thus, we expect a negative influence of a women’s membership duration on the 
likelihood of taking an SHG loan. Moreover, we expect that membership duration will 
not be predictive of the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture relative to other 
investment purposes. Loans can be devoted to productive or consumption purposes in 
our sample. We expect that the choice of the loan purpose may depend on individual 
preferences and constraints, not on the duration of membership. 
Similar to Di Falco et al. (2011), we provide a simple falsification test for the conditions 
of the exclusion restriction described above. We test whether SHG membership (in 
years) influences the likelihood that a household will take an SHG loan (selection 
equation) and conditional on taking a loan in the first stage, whether it influences the 
likelihood, that a household will invest the SHG loan in agriculture (outcome equation). 
For the latter, we estimate a univariate probit model similar to equation (5), but in 
addition we include SHG membership (in years) as a regressor. For the former, we 
estimate a univariate model similar to equation (6). The results are provided in 
Appendix 3.1. We find our exclusion restriction to fulfill both conditions: SHG 
membership (in years) significantly influences the likelihood of taking a SHG loan 
while it does not influence the likelihood of investing the SHG loan in agriculture. 
3.4.3 IV probit model 
In the IV probit model, the outcome equation (8) is similar to equation (5). However, in 
this case, the potentially endogenous regressor, 𝐶𝑖, women’s level of loan control, will 
be instrumented with equation (9): 
𝑌𝑖3
∗ =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑿𝑖 + 𝑖    (8) 
𝐶𝑖 =  𝛾 + 𝜋 𝑍𝑖 +  𝜏 𝑿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖     (9) 
Similar to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the variable 𝑌𝑖3
∗  is unobserved or latent. Instead, we 
observe 𝑌𝑖3 with 𝑌𝑖3 = 1 if 𝑌𝑖3
∗  > 0, and 𝑌𝑖3 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖3
∗  ≤ 0. The corresponding coefficient 
of the potentially endogenous regressor, 𝐶𝑖, is denoted 𝛽1 . Similar to Sections 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2, the vector of control variables, 𝑿𝒊, is included in equations (8) and (9) with the 
corresponding parameter vectors, 𝛽2 and 𝜏, respectively. In the two equations, the 





In equation (9), there must be at least as many instrumental variables as there are 
potentially endogenous regressors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The instrument should 
not directly affect 𝑌𝑖3
∗  in equation (8) but should have a substantial influence on the 
potentially endogenous variable. The variable 𝑍𝒊 will serve as our single instrument for 
the potentially endogenous variable, 𝐶𝑖. The instrument, 𝑍𝑖, refers to the respondent’s 
trust in moneylenders (measured as a binary)
17
. The corresponding coefficient is 
denoted 𝜋.  
We expect trust in moneylenders and women’s level of loan control to be positively 
related for our respondents. Women who are indebted to the SHG may have difficulty in 
repaying their loans on time because usually the obligation to repay begins soon after 
taking the loan and continues on a monthly base in our sampled SHGs. According to 
Jain and Mansuri (2003), this is a business case for moneylenders. They can assist the 
women by offering them another loan. However, what are the women’s options if they 
mistrust moneylenders, e.g., due to the negative image of moneylenders stemming from 
charging usurious interest rates
18
? According to Fernando (2006), women may be 
forced into dependence on their husbands for assistance in repaying the loan when they 
cannot do so on their own. We argue that the husbands may in turn claim greater loan 
control. In contrast, women who trust in moneylenders may not need to rely on their 
husbands and thus may not need to abandon loan control. 
We find a positive correlation (0.410), which is highly significant (p=0.000), between a 
respondent’s trust in moneylenders and our potentially endogenous regressor, women’s 
loan control, for our sub-sample of households that took an SHG loan. Moreover, we 
expect that the respondent’s trust in moneylenders is not a significant exogenous 
regressor in equation (8), as we expect that trust in moneylenders does not affect the 
likelihood of investing the proceeds of an SHG loan in agriculture. We do not expect 
the borrower’s level of trust in another potential source of borrowing, the moneylender, 
to influence the investment activity with the SHG loan. 
3.4.4 Univariate probit model with binary loan control variables 
The three different models, which were presented in the preceding subsections, allow us 
to compare the estimates from the univariate probit, in which we do not control for any 
potential bias from endogeneity, with models in which we address selection bias and the 
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potentially endogeneity of our main explanatory variable, Level of SHG woman's loan 
control, separately
19
. However, even if the estimates from all three models are very 
similar, suggesting that we can rely on the estimates from the univariate probit, the 
models above are prone to another caveat. That is the interpretation of the magnitude of 
the main explanatory variable’s effect, the effect of the ordinally measured Level of 
SHG woman's loan control. Like mentioned above, the variable can take only one of 
three values, zero, one, or two, corresponding to no loan control, partial loan control or 
full loan control, respectively. Thus, one-unit increase on average would not inform us 
of whether this average increase by one unit is driven by the change from no control to 
partial control or by the change from partial control to full control.  
To trace out the effects of the different levels of loan control, we specify a model that 
includes binary regressors for loan control: 
𝑌𝑖4
∗ =  𝛼 + 𝛿1 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑿𝑖 + 𝑖     (10) 
Similar to the preceding sections, the variable 𝑌𝑖4
∗  is latent and thus unobserved. Instead, 
we observe 𝑌𝑖4 with 𝑌𝑖4 = 1 if 𝑌𝑖4
∗  > 0, and 𝑌𝑖4 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖4
∗  ≤ 0. Instead of the variable 𝐶𝑖 
from equation (5), here we include two binary measures for SHG women’s level of loan 
control, 𝐹𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖. For the first measure, 𝐹𝑖 takes 𝐹𝑖 = 1 if the SHG member woman 
exhibits full control over her SHG loan, 𝐹𝑖 = 0 otherwise. For the second measure, 𝑃𝑖 
holds, 𝑃𝑖 = 1 if the SGF member woman exhibits partial control upon the loan, 𝑃𝑖 = 0, 
otherwise. The remainder of the model is similar to the univariate probit model in 
equation (5). Note that 𝐹𝑖 = 1 if 𝐶𝑖 = 2 and that 𝑃𝑖 = 1 if 𝐶𝑖 = 1. As a reference 
category, not included in the model we specify 𝑁𝑖, representing the level of no loan 
control by the SHG woman over her loan, where 𝑁𝑖 = 1 if 𝐶𝑖 = 0. Finally, we provide 
summary statistics in Table 7 for the sub-sample of SHG borrower households and for 
the complete sample, which also includes households that did not take a SHG loan. The 
loan control variables and the outcome measure, Credit for agriculture (dummy), are 
only provided for the SHG borrower households. 
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Credit for agriculture 
(dummy) 0.4567 0.499 
  Level of SHG woman's loan 
control (ordinal scale) 1.3218 0.6746 
  SHG woman has full loan 
control (dummy) 0.4394 0.4972 
  SHG woman has partial loan 
control (dummy) 0.4429 0.4976 
  Male head (dummy) 0.8616 0.3459 0.8439 0.3632 
Education of head (in years) 7.0138 3.9974 7.1685 4.2318 
Age of head (in years) 49.227 12.492 49.5362 12.5156 
Head is married (dummy) 0.9031 0.2963 0.9026 0.2967 
Age of SHG member (in 
years) 43.1792 12.9025 43.0335 12.8833 
Education of SHG member 
(in years) 5.7093 3.9754 6.2025 4.198 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.9204 0.2711 0.9351 0.2466 
General caste (dummy) 0.5363 0.4995 0.558 0.497 
Household size (in members) 4.7197 2.0483 4.5425 2.1153 
Land owned five years ago 
(in acres) 1.6846 2.1883 1.6996 2.4184 
Taluka main city (in km) 16.3598 8.5777 17.0347 8.881 
Next market for agric. 
produce (in km) 10.814 7.102 10.3361 7.2294 
Respondent never read 
newspaper (dummy) 0.5606 0.4972 0.5595 0.4968 
Respondent is risky 




 Source: Based on own household survey data. 
Due to missing values in the data the number of observations for the mean sample is 
lower than the total sample size of 658 households. 
3.5 Descriptive results 
This section provides an overview of the loan purposes chosen by the households. Table 
8 shows how many SHG loans the households currently devote to which agricultural 
purposes. A total of 143 agricultural loan purposes are reported by the households, 
whereas the three categories chosen most often are Agricultural land (37.1%), and loans 
for Farm equipment (28.7%) and Animals (12.6%). Table 9 reports how often the 
households reported each loan purpose. Credit for agriculture is the aggregate of all 





Table 8. SHG loan investments by agricultural purpose 
Loan purpose No. of loan purposes (in %) 
Agricultural land 53 37.1% 
Farm equipment 41 28.7% 
Animals 18 12.6% 
Farm fertilizer 13 9.1% 
Farm seeds 10 7.0% 
Farm building 7 4.9% 
Product/process certification 1 0.7% 
Land title/certification 0 0.0% 
Total 143 100.0% 
Source: Based on own household survey data. 
 
Table 8 are attributable to 132 households that reported at least one, but possibly more, 
agricultural loan purposes. Here, households chose Credit for agriculture (41.6%) most 
often, followed by Home improvement (24.3%) and General/regular expenses (10.1%). 
In total the households reported 317 credit items in the survey. 
Table 9. SHG loan investment by all purposes 
Loan purpose No. of loan purposes (in %) 
Credit for agriculture 132 41.6% 
Home improvement 77 24.3% 
General/regular expenses 32 10.1% 
Education 28 8.8% 
Non-agricultural business 14 4.4% 
Vehicle  12 3.8% 
Social event 11 3.5% 
Health 10 3.2% 
Other 1 0.3% 
Legal court matter 0 0.0% 
Total 317 100.0% 
Source: Based on own household survey data. 
 
In Figure 2, we show how the status of loan control by the SHG member woman is 
distributed across loan purposes. Recall that this ordinally scaled variable can only take 
the values of zero, one and two. We find that, in our key category Credit for 





male spouse both exhibit partial control. Of our 132 SHG borrower households that 
reported agricultural loan purposes, 78 (59.1%) fall into that category. In 35 households 
(26.5%), the SHG member woman exhibits full loan control, and in 19 households 
(14.4%), she exhibits no loan control. Similar to Goetz and Gupta (1996), we find 
variation in SHG loan control across the different loan purposes, although we employ 
different categories of loan purposes. 
 
 
Figure 2. Loan purpose by woman’s loan control. Source: Based on own household survey data. 
 
3.6. Results 
The outcome of interest in our analysis, the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture, 
is first estimated by applying a univariate probit model that is restricted to the sample of 
SHG borrower households. The bivariate probit model, which corrects for sample 
selection, provides very similar parameter estimates and does not indicate endogeneity 
bias, as will be outlined below. In Table 10, the results of both models are displayed. 
Moreover, the IV probit model, which is also restricted to the SHG borrower 
households, yields very similar results and further indicates that the instrumented 
variable, Level of SHG woman’s control, is not endogenous. The regression output is 
attached in Appendix 3.2. Thus, the potential endogeneity bias does not seem to alter 
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univariate probit model, in which we model women’s loan control through binary 
measures, is therefore expected to also provide estimates unaffected by potential 
endogeneity bias. It relies on the same specification, except that the main explanatory 
variable is measured differently. The regression output is also attached at the end of this 
chapter in Appendix 3.3. As discussed in Section 3.4.4, the estimates of our binary 
measures of women’s loan control are superior to the ordinally scaled continuous 
measure because the effect’s magnitude at the different levels of women’s loan control 
can be identified. Below, we continue with the discussion of the point estimates 
(Section 3.6.1), which is followed by Section 3.6.2 that discusses the marginal effects of 
our estimates. 
3.6.1 Discussion of point estimates 
The point estimate of Level of SHG woman’s control is negative and highly significant 
(see Table 10, Column (1)). Thus, the more control the SHG woman exhibits over her 
loan, the less likely her household is to invest the SHG loan in agriculture. As men and 
women generally exhibit a different investment behavior and because agriculture is a 
male-controlled domain in India, this indicates confirmation of our hypothesis. As 
mentioned in the introduction, Garikipati (2008) examines two similar outcomes,  
namely utilizing the loan for the working capital needs of the family farm/business and 
family land investments. In both cases, she also finds the women’s SHG loan control 
variable to reduce the likelihood of the outcome to occur. However, the effect on family 
land investments is insignificant. In contrast to the insignificant effect on family land 
investments, we find a significant effect on agricultural investments, as described above. 
Thus, in terms of significance, our result is similar to that of Garikipati (2008), where 
the investment category is the working capital needs of the family farm/business. 
However, the significant finding in Garikipati (2008) also includes enterprise activity 
that is not restricted to agriculture. The effect of women’s level of loan control may be 
different on investments in the family farm or a family business. Hence, in contrast to 
Garikipati (2008), we show that a measure fully related to agriculture is significantly 
affected by women’s level of loan control. Among the control variables, we find that 
Education of head positively influences the likelihood of investing the loan in 
agriculture. Thus, better-educated households undertake productive and potentially risky 
investments. Moreover, the variable General caste positively influences the likelihood 





Table 10. Likelihood of investing credit in agriculture (Univariate probit and heckprobit models) 
  Probit Probit Heckprobit Heckprobit 
VARIABLES Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Level of SHG woman's loan control 
(ordinal scale) 
-0.449***  -0.441***  
 (0.125)  (0.140)  
Male head (dummy) 0.383 0.272 0.418 0.271 
 (0.544) (0.229) (0.549) (0.229) 
Education of head (in years) 0.0590* 0.00139 0.0582* 0.00129 
 (0.0355) (0.0185) (0.0352) (0.0184) 
Age of head (in years) -0.0157 -0.00832 -0.0169 -0.00827 
 (0.0147) (0.00744) (0.0149) (0.00748) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.239 -0.292 -0.280 -0.290 
 (0.568) (0.260) (0.580) (0.261) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.0137 0.00398 0.0140 0.00393 
 (0.0156) (0.00773) (0.0153) (0.00777) 
Education of SHG member (in years) -0.0458 -0.0397** -0.0508 -0.0396** 
 (0.0328) (0.0185) (0.0378) (0.0184) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.457 -0.246 0.425 -0.242 
 (0.397) (0.225) (0.449) (0.223) 
General caste (dummy) 0.367** -0.0926 0.350* -0.0940 
 (0.169) (0.106) (0.188) (0.107) 
Household size (in members) 0.0386 0.0415 0.0447 0.0408 
 (0.0439) (0.0265) (0.0471) (0.0267) 
Land owned five years ago (in acres) 0.195*** -0.00388 0.191*** -0.00360 
 (0.0508) (0.0220) (0.0575) (0.0220) 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.00496 -0.0105 -0.00683 -0.0105 
 (0.0105) (0.00651) (0.0119) (0.00650) 
Next market for agric. produce (in km) 0.0454*** 0.0120 0.0467*** 0.0120 
 (0.0128) (0.00778) (0.0127) (0.00779) 
Respondent never read newspaper 
(dummy) 
0.00377 -0.112 -0.0119 -0.111 
 (0.170) (0.108) (0.177) (0.108) 
Respondent is risky (dummy) 0.166 -0.0715 0.155 -0.0710 
 (0.187) (0.108) (0.197) (0.108) 
SHG membership (in years)  -0.0329**  -0.0331** 
  (0.0140)  (0.0138) 
Constant -1.258 0.890** -1.322* 0.890** 
 (0.767) (0.441) (0.753) (0.441) 
/athrho   0.228  
   (0.919)  
Rho (P-value in parentheses)   0.224 (0.804)  
Observations 289 647 289 647 
LR Chi2 68.30 31.93 61.25  
Prob < Chi2 0.000 0.006 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.207 0.035   
Source: Based on own household survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1; due to missing values in the data the number of observations in Column (2) and (4) are lower than 







holds, it is plausible that those households take the risk of investing the loan in 
agriculture. Moreover, our proxy for agricultural activity, Land owned five years ago, 
has a positive point estimate: The more land the household owned five years prior to the 
survey, the more likely the household is to invest the loan in agriculture. This is 
plausible, as more land opens more room for investments or may necessitate additional 
maintenance investments, relative to holding less land. Finally, the farther away a 
household is from the nearest market, the more likely the household is to invest in 
agriculture. Productivity is lower in more remote areas (Stifel & Minten, 2008). The 
likelihood of investing credit in agriculture may be positively related to the degree of 
remoteness, as discussed in Section 3.4.1. 
As stated above, the bivariate probit model, which corrects for sample selection, yields 
similar parameter estimates. The outcome equation is displayed in Column (3) of Table 
10. The exclusion restriction, SHG membership (in years), is negative and significant, 
as expected (see Column (4)). In addition, Education of SHG member is negative and 
significant in that selection equation. This may initially appear puzzling, as better-
educated women would be expected to better judge the opportunities and risks of taking 
a loan and would thus be expected to be more likely to take an SHG loan. This appears 
particularly likely in our context of rural India, where there remains welfare potential to 
be tapped through investments. However, as the aim of SHGs is to improve the 
livelihoods of poor and deprived women it appears plausible that, within an SHG group, 
the less-educated women may be more likely to take a loan, as they may be particularly 
encouraged by the group (Galab & Rao, 2003). 
The bivariate probit model further indicates that no endogeneity bias from unobserved 
differences among SHG borrower and non-borrower households is present when the 
outcome equation is estimated separately. As indicated by Rho, the correlation between 
the outcome and selection equations’ error terms amounts to 0.224 and is insignificant 
with a corresponding P-value of 0.804. 
3.6.2 Discussion of marginal effects 
To gauge the size of our effects, we display the marginal effects at the mean in Table 11 
for the univariate probit model, the bivariate probit model with sample selection and the 
IV probit model. The signs and magnitudes of the marginal effects are very similar 
across the three models. We find that a one-unit increase in a woman’s level of loan 












 (1) (2) (3) 
Level of SHG woman's loan 
control (ordinal scale) -0.178 -0.168 -0.199 
 (3.58)*** (2.15)** (1.71)* 
Male head (dummy) 0.152 0.159 0.146 
 (0.70) (0.78) (0.67) 
Education of head (in years) 0.023 0.022 0.023 
 (1.66)* (1.50) (1.63) 
Age of head (in years) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (1.07) (1.17) (1.09) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.095 -0.106 -0.094 
 (0.42) (0.49) (0.42) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.88) (0.89) (0.90) 
Education of SHG member  
(in years) -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 
 (1.40) (1.53) (1.35) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.181 0.162 0.180 
 (1.15) (0.84) (1.15) 
General caste (dummy) 0.145 0.133 0.145 
 (2.17)** (1.50) (2.17)** 
Household size (in members) 0.015 0.017 0.015 
 (0.88) (1.02) (0.89) 
Land owned five years ago  
(in acres) 0.077 0.073 0.076 
 (3.81)*** (2.17)** (3.64)*** 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.47) (0.61) (0.50) 
Next market for agric. produce 
 (in km) 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 (3.55)*** (3.03)*** (3.56)*** 
Respondent never read newspaper 
(dummy) 0.001 -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.00) 
Respondent is risky (dummy) 0.066 0.059 0.064 
 (0.89) (0.73) (0.86) 
Observations 289 289 289 
Source: Based on own household survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 








effect size is -16.8% in the bivariate probit model with sample selection and -19.9% in 
the IV probit model. The problem of interpreting this effect stems from the ordinal 
scale. The effect states the percentage change in our outcome measure for an increase in 
women’s loan control by one unit. However, a caveat remains, namely that we cannot 
distinguish the differences among the different levels of women’s loan control and have 
to interpret the effect’s magnitude carefully. Thus, below, we discuss the marginal 
effects of the model, where loan control is modeled using binary variables. 
First, however, we discuss the marginal effects of the control variables. Although the 
effects of Education of head are very similar in magnitude (ranging between 2.2% and 
2.3% in all three models) and show the same sign in all three models, the significance 
varies. The effect of the household head’s education, albeit positive in all models, is 
statistically significant only in the univariate probit model in Column (1). Nevertheless, 
the significance is weak. The effect of General caste ranges between 13.3% and 14.5% 
in all three models but is only statistically significant (at the 5-% level) in the uni- 
variate probit and the IV probit model. The effect of land owned five years ago is 
statistically significant in all three models. For each additional acre of land size, the 
likelihood of investing the SHG loan in agriculture increases by 7.7% in the univariate 
probit model, see Column (1). In the bivariate probit with sample correction, the effect 
amounts to 7.3%, see Column (2), and in the IV probit to 7.6%, see Column (3). Finally, 
the effect of Next market for agric. produce is positive and significant in all three 
models. Each additional kilometer of distance increases the likelihood of investing the 
SHG loan by 1.8% in all three models. Nevertheless, although we find differences in 
statistical significance for some effects, our main effect, Level of SHG woman’s loan 
control, remains statistically significant across all three models. The variation in 
significance can stem from larger standard errors in the IV probit and bivariate probit 
model with sample selection (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
As discussed above, the marginal effects in all three models are very similar, but we 
cannot distinguish at which stage the loan control of women over their SHG loans really 
matters for the household’s likelihood of investing the SHG loan in agriculture. The 
marginal effects, provided in Table 12, show that the likelihood of investing the SHG 
loan in agriculture is 25.6% lower for households in which the SHG member woman 
exhibits full control over the loan, relative to households, in which women exhibit no 





Table 12. Marginal effects (at means): Likelihood of investing credit in agriculture 
(binary measures for loan control) 
 Univariate probit model with two 
binary loan control regressors 
SHG woman has full loan control (dummy) -0.256 
 (2.40)** 
SHG woman has partial loan control (dummy) 0.038 
 (0.34) 
Male head (dummy) 0.077 
 (0.36) 
Education of head (in years) 0.024 
 (1.74)* 
Age of head (in years) -0.006 
 (0.96) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.092 
 (0.41) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.005 
 (0.78) 
Education of SHG member (in years) -0.018 
 (1.44) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.180 
 (1.12) 
General caste (dummy) 0.145 
 (2.16)** 
Household size (in members) 0.019 
 (1.05) 
Land owned five years ago (in acres) 0.075 
 (3.69)*** 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.001 
 (0.22) 
Next market for agric. produce (in km) 0.017 
 (3.29)*** 
Respondent never read newspaper (dummy) 0.025 
 (0.36) 
Respondent is risky (dummy) 0.064 
 (0.88) 
Observations 289 
Source: Based on own household survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
women only exhibits partial control, the effect is nearly zero and insignificant. Thus, 
women’s full loan control is of particular relevance for the investment outcome, relative 
to the case of no loan control. In contrast, the difference between partial loan control 
and no loan control does not affect the likelihood of agricultural investments. Recall 
that the significant marginal effect of the ordinally scaled measure for women’s loan 
control, from the univariate probit model in Column 5 of Table 11 is -17.8%. In 





effect of the ordinally scaled measure is driven by the change from partial control to full 
control and not by the change from no control to partial control. Among the control 
variables, the same variables as in the univariate probit model with the continuous 
measure of women’s loan control (Table 11) are significant. Moreover, these effects are 
very similar in magnitude and show the same sign. These variables are Education of 
head (in years), General caste (dummy), Land owned five years ago (in acres) and Next 
market for agric. produce (in km). 
3.7 Discussion and policy implications 
We find that a household’s likelihood of investing the SHG loan in agriculture 
decreases with increasing loan control by SHG women. In particular, when women fully 
control their SHG loans, compared to the case of no loan control, the effect is strong. 
We interpret our results in the context of differences in investment patterns between 
men and women. The more control a woman has over her SHG loan, the less her male 
spouse has control over the loan, and thus the less likely is an investment in a domain 
controlled by men, namely agriculture. This inverse relationship shows that the level of 
women’s loan control is relevant for the household’s decision regarding agricultural 
investments. Our findings suggest a tradeoff between a woman’s level of control over 
her SHG loan and potential welfare improvements for the whole household. In our 
sample of SHG member households, we can show that the tradeoff is present. 
On the one hand, the inverse relationship found in our analysis implies that there is less 
agricultural investment than is potentially possible. Investments in agriculture are 
important for welfare development because of their potential for increasing 
productivity. This may lead to income increases for the investing households as a 
whole, including the SHG member women. 
On the other hand, less loan control for SHG women leaves them with the obligation to 
repay the loan, while eliminating their ability to generate the funds for repayment. In the 
absence of alternative sources of funds to repay the loan, this can impair the women’s 
credit risk reputation and thus may further reduce loan uptake through the SHG. Less 
access to additional credit can further impede (agricultural) investments. The dynamics 
that might follow the tradeoff remain unclear. Does the tradeoff cease to exist when 
women may ultimately be denied further access to loans in an extreme case and SHG 





remain stable, as women manage to repay their loans, despite their inability to draw on 
their loan to generate the necessary funds, when they lack loan control? 
We suggest measures intended to diminish the tradeoff, but not in the way, described 
above, whereby the denial of further loans to women solves the tradeoff. First, in the 
long run, policies should enable women to invest in agriculture. Currently, women may 
withdraw from agricultural investments because agriculture remains prone to men’s 
control
20
. Easing access to land for women may enable women to invest in agriculture. 
This needs to be complemented by general policies fostering gender equality (Roy, 
2015; Hunt & Kasynathan, 2001)
21
. 
Moreover, according to Upadhyay (2005), women in India can be disadvantaged in 
marketing agricultural produce because, as mentioned in Section 3.2, marketing 
activities such as finding a buyer, negotiating the price or transporting the produce to 
the market is controlled by men. Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa also shows that 
women are disadvantaged when marketing agricultural produce. Banerjee et al. (2014) 
find female farmers to be discriminated against in the form of lower prices when 
marketing agricultural produce in Cameroon. According to Handschuch and Wollni 
(2016), women face higher barriers then men when marketing traditional food crops in 
Kenya and suggest that women may increasingly participate in markets when they are 
members of a farmer group. For India, such evidence remains scarce. However, further 
research may investigate the extent to which marketing opportunities can be improved 
for women in India to enable women to invest in agriculture. 
Second, in the short term, we suggest measures that may facilitate women’s investment 
in agriculture by focusing on women’s loan control. Although it requires more detailed 
theoretical elaboration and practical testing, we suggest one potential approach below. 
Our suggestion calls, first, for capacity-building measures in women’s SHGs and, 
second, for rural development policy measures to enable such SHG capacity building
22
. 
According to Holvoet (2005), women’s status in decision making improves through 
participating in group-lending and when the former is combined with technical and 
social awareness training. 
We focus on a somewhat different, yet similar, suggestion. SHGs may consider offering 
an additional means of loan distribution. To reduce men’s influence on SHG member 
                                                 
20
 See e.g. Agarwal (2003) for elaboration on the example of gender and land rights in India. 
21
 See e.g. Alesina et al. (2013) for recent research on gender roles and agriculture. 
22





women’s loans, we suggest that SHGs offer the following to their member women: 
Cash loans are not forwarded from the SHG to the SHG member woman, as fungible 
cash loans are always vulnerable to eventual acquisition. Instead, the SHG and the 
member woman should develop an investment agreement, whereby the SHG, the SHG 
member woman and an investment counterpart are involved. For illustrative purposes, 
imagine an investment in seeds. The investment counterpart would be the corresponding 
seed trader. The investment agreement than incorporates monetary transfers from the 
SHG to the trader. The trader confirms the inflow of money on behalf of the SHG 
woman and grants her the right to collect the seeds. Finally, the SHG woman has to 
repay the loan plus interest to the SHG. No cash flow from the SHG to the SHG 
member women is involved, and thus cash cannot be acquired by the men in the SHG 
member women’s households. 
The model is not limited to investment counterparts in agriculture. In principle, the 
primary investment domains, to which the model can be applied, may be identified at 
the local level. However, to address the above-mentioned tradeoff, we suggest a focus 
on agriculture. Such a measure requires coordination with stakeholders as potential 
investment counterparts as illustrated above. However, as the women may still prefer to 
simply take the cash home, this model should instead be an additional offer, as 
mentioned above, and not entirely replace the current practice of handing out the cash to 
the women directly. However, the suggestion outlined briefly above requires further 
theoretical investigation and practical testing, which is left for further research. This 
approach offers the potential for diminishing the tradeoff we observed by increasing 
women’s loan control. 
Note that the elaborated suggestions are all intended to enable the women to invest in 
agriculture. However, their preferences for investment purposes may vary. In Figure 2 
in Section 3.5, we show that many women who fully control their SHG loans also invest 
in Home improvement or utilize the loan for General/regular expenses. Does this 
investment behavior reflect the women’s investment preferences, or are the current 
choices an outcome of the unattractiveness of investing in agriculture? The extent to 
which measures intended to attract women’s investment in agriculture can be successful 
in achieving this goal remains to be addressed. 
Our suggestion for diminishing the tradeoff does not mean that women should be solely 





dissuading them from other investment activities. On the contrary, the suggested 
measures are intended to remove constraints on women’s investment decisions. 
Removing such constraints offers the potential for welfare gains through additional 
productivity-increasing agricultural investments while not curbing women’s level of 
loan control. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In our econometric analysis, we find that the likelihood of investing credit in agriculture 
diminishes with increasing control of SHG women over their SHG loans. This inverse 
relationship between women’s level of control over SHG loans and agricultural 
investments suggests that women’s SHG loan control matters for the household’s 
investment outcomes. This contrasts with the findings of Garikipati (2008), where 
investments in family land (another measure of agricultural investments) are not 
significantly affected by women’s level of loan control. However, Garikipati (2008) 
finds a significant decrease in the likelihood of using the SHG loan for family 
farm/enterprise working capital given greater loan control by women. Complementing 
Garikipati (2008), we present a comparison of estimations that ignore potential 
endogeneity biases with estimations that address them. We find similar results across all 
specifications. 
Our finding calls for measures to reduce the tradeoff between women’s loan control and 
potential benefits at the household level (stemming from agricultural investments). 
Suggested approaches to diminish the tradeoff are improved access to land rights and 
markets for women in our rural study area setting in India. Further, increased loan 
control in combination with agricultural investment counterparts can be explored to 
address the tradeoff. 
A disadvantage of our analysis is that we cannot determine whether the women abandon 
loan control voluntarily. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of an involuntary 
loss of loan control. Our policy suggestions thus suggest that women can voluntarily 
transfer loan control while remaining protected from involuntary loss of loan control 
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Appendix 3.1: Falsification test for exclusion restriction 
 Dependent variable: 
Household invests 
SHG loan in 
agriculture (dummy) 
Dependent variable: 
Household has taken 
SHG loan (dummy) 
VARIABLES Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) 
   
Level of SHG woman's loan control (ordinal scale) -0.448***  
 (0.126)  
Male head (dummy) 0.385 0.272 
 (0.546) (0.229) 
Education of head (in years) 0.0592* 0.00139 
 (0.0357) (0.0185) 
Age of head (in years) -0.0161 -0.00832 
 (0.0147) (0.00744) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.245 -0.292 
 (0.569) (0.260) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.0135 0.00398 
 (0.0157) (0.00773) 
Education of SHG member (in years) -0.0457 -0.0397** 
 (0.0328) (0.0185) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.474 -0.246 
 (0.390) (0.225) 
General caste (dummy) 0.373** -0.0926 
 (0.170) (0.106) 
Household size (in members) 0.0403 0.0415 
 (0.0436) (0.0265) 
Land owned five years ago (in acres) 0.194*** -0.00388 
 (0.0507) (0.0220) 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.00575 -0.0105 
 (0.0106) (0.00651) 
Next market for agric. produce (in km) 0.0458*** 0.0120 
 (0.0128) (0.00778) 
Respondent never read newspaper (dummy) 0.00502 -0.112 
 (0.170) (0.108) 
Respondent is risky (dummy) 0.171 -0.0715 
 (0.186) (0.108) 
SHG membership (in years) 0.0103 -0.0329** 
 (0.0234) (0.0140) 
Constant -1.326* 0.890** 
 (0.764) (0.441) 
   
Observations 289 647 
LR Chi2 31.93 31.93 
Prob < Chi2 0.00659 0.00659 
Pseudo R2 0.2080 0.0351 
Source: Based on own household survey data. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Due to missing values in the data the number of observations in Column (2) is lower than the total 





Appendix 3.2: Likelihood of investing credit in agriculture (IV probit) 
 2
nd
 stage  1
st
 stage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Level of SHG woman's loan control (ordinal scale) -0.502*  
 (0.294)  
Male head (dummy) 0.368 -0.432* 
 (0.552) (0.223) 
Education of head (in years) 0.0580 -0.0201 
 (0.0356) (0.0132) 
Age of head (in years) -0.0161 -0.00768 
 (0.0148) (0.00566) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.237 0.228 
 (0.567) (0.246) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.0142 0.00977 
 (0.0158) (0.00606) 
Education of SHG member (in years) -0.0448 0.0212* 
 (0.0331) (0.0127) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.456 0.135 
 (0.397) (0.157) 
General caste (dummy) 0.367** -0.0156 
 (0.169) (0.0714) 
Household size (in members) 0.0389 -0.000665 
 (0.0439) (0.0203) 
Land owned five years ago (in acres) 0.192*** -0.0268 
 (0.0525) (0.0167) 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.00541 -0.00539 
 (0.0107) (0.00501) 
Next market for agric. produce (in km) 0.0455*** -0.00104 
 (0.0128) (0.00587) 
Respondent never read newspaper (dummy) -0.000428 -0.0285 
 (0.170) (0.0766) 
Respondent is risky (dummy) 0.161 -0.0903 
 (0.188) (0.0738) 
Respondent trusts moneylenders (dummy)  0.589*** 
  (0.0728) 
Constant -1.165 1.392*** 
 (0.881) (0.342) 
/athrho 0.037  
 (0.188)  
/lnsigma -0.532  
 (0.041)  
Rho (P-value in parentheses) 0.037 (0.844)  
Sigma 0.588  
Observations 289  
LR Chi2 63.03  
Prob < Chi2 0.000  
Source: Based on own household survey data. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 









SHG woman has full loan control (dummy) -0.646** 
 (0.269) 
SHG woman has partial loan control (dummy) 0.0962 
 (0.280) 
Male head (dummy) 0.196 
 (0.551) 
Education of head (in years) 0.0610* 
 (0.0351) 
Age of head (in years) -0.0144 
 (0.0150) 
Head is married (dummy) -0.233 
 (0.564) 
Age of SHG member (in years) 0.0124 
 (0.0158) 
Education of SHG member (in years) -0.0460 
 (0.0319) 
Hindu household (dummy) 0.456 
 (0.408) 
General caste (dummy) 0.367** 
 (0.170) 
Household size (in members) 0.0474 
 (0.0452) 
Land owned five years ago (in acres) 0.188*** 
 (0.0507) 
Taluka main city (in km) -0.00229 
 (0.0106) 
Next market for agric. produce (in km) 0.0429*** 
 (0.0130) 
Respondent never read newspaper (dummy) 0.0628 
 (0.173) 






LR Chi2 76.42 
Prob < Chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.219 
Source: Based on own household survey data. 









Access to financial resources, in particular credit, offers the potential to alleviate 
poverty. This dissertation focuses on two studies of financial decision making to 
contribute to the understanding of financial outcomes in rural India, where poverty 
remains pressing. The focus on financial decision making in rural India complements 
the attention that has been devoted to the supply side of financial services, related 
market failures and the counter measures implemented to address them.  
4.1 Summary of findings 
For the first study (Chapter 2), we conducted an experiment with respondents from 
SHG member households in rural India. In the experiment, we simulated a tax on 
mental capacity and tested its influence on the respondent’s level of financial literacy. 
Moreover, we tested the influence of a financial incentive on the respondent’s level of 
financial literacy. According to the official poverty line for the State of Maharashtra, we 
divided our sample into poor and non-poor. For the respondents belonging to poor 
households, we found that the tax on mental capacity negatively influences the 
respondent’s level of financial literacy. For the respondents who belong to non-poor 
households we found no evidence of a negative influence of the tax on mental capacity 
on the respondent’s level of financial literacy. Further, exposure to the financial 
incentive increases the level of financial literacy for the poor and non-poor alike. The 
financial incentive does not demand additional overall mental capacity from the 
respondents. In a third treatment, the respondents were exposed to the mental capacity 
tax and the financial incentive in a double treatment. For the poor respondents, this 
double treatment led to no difference in the level of financial literacy, relative to the 
control group. However, it did for the non-poor respondents. The non-poor respondents 
in that treatment scored higher than the control group. 
The findings show that, in the context of poverty, financial literacy is negatively 
affected by the tax on mental capacity. Moreover, this loss of financial literacy can be 
counteracted through financial incentives. In the context of financial decision making in 
rural India, where poverty is present, the tax on mental capacity may be one factor that 
hampers financial decision making. Subsequently, imperfect financial decision making 
may undermine an individual’s efforts to overcome poverty. In Section 4.2, we will 





In the second study (Chapter 3), we analyzed the relationship between an SHG member 
woman’s level of loan control and the likelihood of the household of investing that SHG 
loan in agriculture. We found that the likelihood of investing the SHG loan in 
agriculture diminishes with an increase in loan control by the SHG woman. The inverse 
relationship between women’s loan control and agricultural investments suggests that 
loan control matters for the investment outcome. This may impose a burden on the 
borrower women. Agriculture is a domain controlled by men, and the household is more 
likely to invest in that domain when the SHG member women exhibit lower loan 
control. This leaves the obligation to repay the loan with the SHG women, but removes 
their ability to utilize the loan to generate the funds for loan repayment. Thus, they 
might be left with a burden that, unfortunately accompanies increased access to credit 
through women’s SHGs. Nevertheless, the household as a whole may reap the benefits 
from productive investments in agriculture. 
Regarding the literature on women’s empowerment, we build on the finding that it is 
crucial to distinguish between women’s access to and control over loans (Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999). We contribute to the literature on financial decision 
making by presenting econometric evidence that loan control by SHG women over their 
SHG loans determines the financial outcomes of the household. 
The findings from Chapter 3 shed further light onto the process of financial decision 
making in the context of rural India. A household’s investment decision depends on 
control over the loan. Moreover, productive investments (the evidence is restricted to 
SHG loans here) may, on the one hand, promise welfare improvements for the whole 
household but, on the other hand, may also imply detrimental consequences for women 
regarding their ability to repay loans. 
4.2 Policy recommendations 
We derive separate policy recommendations from each of the two studies. In Chapter 2 
we have shown that a tax on mental capacity can negatively influence financial literacy, 
when poverty is present. Thus, we derive policy recommendations of two types from 
Chapter 2. First, in line with the World Bank (2015), we argue that poor people may be 
assisted in financial matters to circumvent the lower level of financial literacy. 
According to Beck at al. (2005), bank paperwork can prove to be difficult for clients. 
Thus, e.g., bank staff that assist clients in completing bank paperwork may overcome a 





Further, we suggest that it is worthwhile to explore measures that go beyond simply 
assisting individuals whose financial literacy is negatively affected by a tax on mental 
capacity. We show that, in principle, a financial incentive can increase financial literacy 
for individuals negatively affected by a tax on mental capacity. Financial incentives 
could be included in financial literacy trainings to incentivize additional learning effort. 
Moreover, financial incentives could be implemented in conditional cash-transfer-
systems. Cash inflows can enable individuals to meet financial obligations and thus 
reduce the effect of the mental capacity tax. Consequently, effective cash-transfer-
systems may increase financial literacy. 
In Chapter 3, we have shown that an inverse relationship exists between an SHG 
woman’s level of loan control and a household’s likelihood of investing the SHG loan 
in agriculture. This inverse relationship suggests a tradeoff between an SHG woman’s 
level of loan control and the potential benefits for the household as a whole, stemming 
from productive agricultural investments. We suggest measures to diminish the tradeoff. 
First, easing access to land and markets may enable women to invest in agriculture. 
Second, we suggest that measures that strengthen women’s loan control may diminish 
the tradeoff. SHGs may consider introducing an additional channel for distributing 
loans. Then, the SHG member women may choose not to receive the loan directly but 
have it forwarded to an agricultural investment counterpart. In this way, the cash loan 
cannot be acquired by the male spouse and the women can undertake an agricultural 
investment. 
4.3 Limitations and further research 
The findings from Chapter 2 rely on an experiment conducted during our household 
survey in rural India. To derive robust conclusions for policy recommendations, its 
external validity needs to be tested with broader populations than that studied here. Our 
sample is restricted to member households of women’s SHGs. 
Moreover, the experimental setting simplifies the real world to a large extent and 
depicts only one scenario among many. The effects we found for the tax on mental 
capacity might vary if we alter the treatment design. The treatment may have provided 
different results if the hypothetical financial obligation were not Rs. 50,000 but instead 
lower or higher. Similarly, we expect our financial incentive treatment’s effect to vary 





qualifies a respondent for earning the financial reward. Further research may elicit 
responsiveness in the treatment effects toward the treatment design in a systematic way. 
In Chapter 3, the results rely on econometric methods for cross-sectional data. The issue 
of endogeneity, although addressed in several ways, remains a potential source of bias 
of our results. We instrument our main explanatory variable, Level of SHG woman's 
loan control, but unobserved factors may still lead to biased coefficients of other 
independent variables. In a panel data set with several survey rounds, we could control 
for unobserved factors, assuming that they are consistent over time, and thus further 
control for endogeneity bias. Unfortunately, we were unable to rely on panel data.  
Furthermore, had the necessary data been available, we could have relied on different 
modeling approaches for the potentially endogenous loan control variable in the IV 
probit estimations. A more suitable instrument could have been drawn from past loan 
control behavior, which is not influenced by current investment decisions. Thus, our 
results should be interpreted with caution, and they lack a further robustness check in 
the form of another specification of our IV probit estimation. 
Similarly, the exclusion restriction in the bivariate probit model with sample selection 
could be complemented by a further robustness check. Distance to the SHG meetings, 
e.g., would be an option for an alternative exclusion restriction. However, the necessary 
information is not available in the data. 
To avoid endogeneity bias and the need for counter-measures in further studies, the 
explanatory variables should be genuinely exogenous in nature. A potential approach 
would be to rely on a controlled experimental setting, in which the respondent’s level of 
loan control would be randomly assigned. Investment decisions regarding funds could 
be modeled and the available options for what to do with the funds could be randomly 
limited across the respondents. 
In general, financial decision making remains a research area that may offer contri-
butions to understanding individual and household behavior. In the particular context of 
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